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"IT'S NOT EASY BEING GREEN": LOCAL INITIATIVES,
PREEMPTION PROBLEMS, AND THE MARKET
PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION
Michael Burger *
This Article considers whether the market participant exception
should be interpreted to exempt local climate change and
sustainability initiatives from the "ceilings" imposed by existing
environmental laws and pending federal climate change legislation.
In the decades-long absence offederal action on climate change, local
governments-along with the states-positioned themselves at the
forefront of climate change and sustainability planning. In fact, state
and local actions account for most of the nation's greenhouse gas
reduction efforts to date. Yet, front-running localities are being
limited by a preemption doctrine that fails to account for both the
motives behind their initiatives and the actual effect they have on
federal schemes. Indeed, while environmental law has long sought a
balance between federalization and devolution of regulatory
authority, current preemption doctrine, as applied to federal
"ceilings, " almost exclusively favors federalization values. The
market participant exception offers a means to correct this imbalance.
This Article begins by providing a detailed discussion of the evolution
of the market participant exception in the dormant Commerce Clause
and preemption contexts and unpacking the rationales behind federal
floors" and "ceilings." It then analyzes the collapsing roles of
governments and corporations as regulators and market actors, and
recasts the work of local governments undertaking climate change
initiatives as a "race to the top" of the market for "green" places to
live, work, and invest. The Article then articulates a revised test for
the market participant exception and illustrates through several case
studies how the test can successfully empower local autonomy and
enable local innovation without sacrificing the benefits offederal law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been almost twenty years since world leaders gathered at the
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro pledged to reduce emissions of carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases (GHGs).' At the climate change
conference in Stockholm, Sweden, last December, leaders reiterated this
commitment, though again without binding themselves to a specific
course of action.2 Meanwhile, average carbon dioxide (CO2) saturation
levels continue to rise.3
Domestically, what success there has been in reducing GHG
emissions has been generated at the state and local level.4 Coalitions of
states have banded together to form regional markets for GHG emissions
trading. Individual states have established climate action plans, set
targets for GHG reductions, and adopted renewable portfolio standards
that require them to derive an increasing percentage of their energy
pools from renewable sources, such as wind, solar, and geothermal. At
the same time, local governments have pursued a diverse array of
climate change and sustainability initiatives, from "greening"
government operations and purchase practices, to revising commercial
and residential building codes, to adopting long-term plans that
incorporate these and other measures.
Now, as the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009
(ACESA) and the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act (Boxer-
Kerry bill) wind through Congress, 5 and the Environmental Protection
1. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849
* 1992) [hereinafter UNFCC]. The main greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide,
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 5 n.5
(2007) (referring to gases covered under UNFCC).
2. UNFCC, supra note 1, Decision -/CP.15 (taking note of the Copenhagen Accord of 18
December 2009); see also Andrew C. Revkin & John M. Broder, Grudging Accord on Climate, Along
With Plenty of Discord, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,2009, at Al.
3. In 1992, average CO2 saturation levels measured at the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii
measured 357.73 parts per million (ppm); in 2009, those levels rose to 388.77 ppm. Carbonify.com,
Atmospheric carbon dioxide levels, http://www.carbonify.com/carbon-dioxide-levels.htm (last visited
Apr. 11, 2010).
4. See Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 778-86 (2006) (discussing
disappearance of federal presence in environmental law and emergence of state activism).
5. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111 th Cong. (as passed by
House, June 26, 2009) [hereinafter ACESA]; Clean Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th
Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, Feb. 2, 2010); see also John M. Broder,
House Backs Bill, 219-212, to Curb Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2009, at Al; Darren
Samuelsohn, Senate Climate Bill Faces Narrow Window for Action in 2010, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/1 1/16/I 6climatewire-senate-climate-bill-faces-narrow-window-for-
82097.html Because Boxer-Kerry was reported out of committee in early February and at this time
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Agency contemplates and implements an array of regulatory options, 6
the fate of these local initiatives has become uncertain. Existing
environmental laws have already been found to preempt some local
action, and the pending legislation promises much the same, perhaps
even overriding some of the more stringent standards already set.
Paradoxically, then, the long-awaited federal action on climate change
threatens to stifle the competition, collaboration, and innovation that
paved its way. And perversely, it could undermine its own ostensible
purpose: to reduce GHG emissions to a level that will mitigate the
adverse impacts from climate change.
This absurd result would follow from the inscription of "ceiling
preemption" into the law. Ceiling preemption exists where federal law
sets a maximum (or uniform) standard above (and below) which states
and localities cannot go. 7  Generally, federal environmental law has
concerned itself more with setting "floors," or minimum standards,
designed to prevent a "race to the bottom" among jurisdictions
competing for industries seeking lax regulation. There has been,
however, a trend in recent years towards ceiling preemption,8 which has
the reverse effect of preventing a "race to the top" among jurisdictions
remains a far way from passing the Senate, this Article focuses on provisions of ACESA. For a good
summary of preemption under Boxer-Kerry, see William Buzbee, Boxer-Kerry: Measures to Address
Error and Illegality, CPRBlog (Oct. 5, 2009), http://www.progressivereform.org/
CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=26AA1345-C71B-3C79-0B6C7A24A8DEE099.
6. See Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260 (Oct. 30, 2009);
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292
(proposed Oct. 27, 2009); Proposed Rulemaking To Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas
Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 49,454 (proposed
Sept. 28, 2009); Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886 (proposed Apr. 24, 2009); Regulating
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354 (proposed July 30, 2008).
7. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1554 (2007) (recasting definition of ceiling
preemption as "unitary federal choice"); Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action
Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate
Change, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 579, 583 (2008) ("When federal law preempts more stringent or
environmentally protective state regulations, it establishes a ceiling above which states cannot go .... ).
8. For instance, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT 2005) grants the federal government
exclusive jurisdiction over the siting of liquefied natural gas terminals. Energy Policy Act of 2005
§ 311 (c)(2), 15 U.S.C. 717b(e)(1) (2006). The attempts in the later years of the Bush administration to
preempt state tort law by federal regulation represent another form of ceiling. See Catherine Sharkey,
Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUJL L. REV.
227 (2007) (discussing numerous federal agency attempts to preempt state common law and regulation);
cf Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200-03 (2009) (FDA preamble declaring preemptive effect to
drug labeling requirements not entitled to deference where there was no formal notice-and-comment and
preemption ran against apparent congressional intent); Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 24, 693 (May 20, 2009) (Presidential memorandum directing
administrative chiefs not to preempt by preamble or regulation, and to review regulations from previous
ten years).
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competing for residents and businesses seeking a "green" place to live
and work.
Though many have called for federal climate change floors, 9 the law
is likely to impose ceilings in at least some areas. 10 Indeed, ACESA, in
its current form, combines ceilings and floors that will challenge local
initiatives. For example, Title III (Reducing Global Warming Pollution)
includes a nationwide cap-and-trade system," which, by design,
imposes a ceiling of a sort. 12  Title I (Clean Energy) offers a mix of
floors and silence whose full meaning is unclear. Title II (Energy
Efficiency) maintains the ceilings imposed by current energy efficiency
and vehicle emissions standards established under the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act (EPCA) and Clean Air Act.' 3  Localities seeking to
create green building codes and increase the hybrid vehicles serving as
public or quasi-public transportation have already been preempted by
these standards.
Regardless of the final language of federal law, lawsuits will follow,
seeking to clarify the reach of any express preemption provisions or
decipher whether ceiling preemption might be implied. 14  Thus, an
9. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 7, at 1556 (arguing that ceiling preemption threatens to
surrender the benefits of "intersystemic interaction inherent in federalist schemes"); Glicksman & Levy,
supra note 7 at 616-47 (arguing that collective action problems support setting federal floors rather than
ceilings); William L. Andreen, Federal Climate Change Legislation and Preemption, 276 ENVTL. &
ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 261 (2008) (arguing that regional variation of climate impacts, need for
continuing regulatory innovation and other factors weigh in favor of establishing federal floors for
stationary sources).
10. See U.S. CLIMATE ACTION P'SHIP, A BLUEPRINT FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION (2009),
http://www.us-cap.org/pdf/USCAPBlueprint.pdf (calling for cap-and-trade program that will result in
80% reductions in GHG emissions from 2005 levels by 2050); see also J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman,
Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1552-
53 (2007) (discussing convergence of industry and environmentalist support for cap-and-trade). For a
discussion of industry's tendency to support federal regulation in the face of differing state standards,
see Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90
IOWA L. REV. 377,466 (2005).
11. See ACESA, supra note 5, § 311 (amending Clean Air Act to include cap-and-trade program
for GHGs).
12. ACESA expressly preempts regional and state cap-and-trade systems for a five year period.
Id. § 335 (providing that "no State or political subdivision thereof shall implement or enforce a cap and
trade program that covers any capped emissions emitted during the years 2012 through 2017"). What
happens after that is unknown, though it is difficult to see revived regional markets surviving
preemption challenges after that time. See, e.g., Clean Air Mkts. Group v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82 (2d Cir.
2003) (holding restrictive covenants on SO 2 allowances imposed by New York State regulation
preempted by acid rain cap-and-trade regime); Glicksman & Levy, supra note 7, at 643-47 (explaining
how state regulation could undermine efficiency goals of the "trade" component of a cap-and-trade
regime); Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 879,
914-20 (2008) (discussing preemption problems likely to arise under federal cap-and-trade).
13. ACESA,supra note 5, §§ 201, 211-13,221.
14. Courts might prove quite sympathetic to implied preemption claims. See Samuel Issacharoff
& Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353 (2006) (arguing that
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interpretive question emerges: How should courts treat local initiatives
in response to questions of ceiling preemption? And, if the federal law
fails, how should courts treat these initiatives under the current spectrum
of environmental statutes?
I am concerned, here, with this interpretive question, and in particular,
the potential role the market participant exception (MPE) might play in
saving local initiatives from preemption once the political choices have
been made. 15 In this sense, my purposes are overtly pragmatic: Under
the dormant Commerce Clause, the dual goals of maintaining the
national market and affording localities regulatory autonomy can be
balanced. 16  Preemption doctrine, by contrast, at least as applied to
federal ceilings, insufficiently accounts for both the purpose of local
action and its potential impact on a federalized scheme; and the Supreme
Court has effectively foreclosed what room there may have been to
bring them in through that doctrine. 17  The MPE provides a means to
bring local purposes and federal effects to bear on questions of ceiling
preemption.
But my purposes here are also intentionally provocative. This Article
argues that municipalities attempts to brand themselves "green" to
increase their competitiveness in the interlocal market for residents,
businesses, and capital warrant a revised application of the MPE to
federal ceiling preemption. Under the prevailing rule, the MPE applies
where government is acting in its "proprietary" or "participatory"
capacity-i.e., as a purchaser or seller of goods or services-rather than
in its "governmental" or "regulatory" capacity-i.e., as an executor,
legislator, or administrator of police power. Phrased differently, the
question is whether a local law "should be treated like state regulation of
private parties or like the marketing policy of a private business." 8 This
distinction, however, is less clear than it seems at first glance, providing
Supreme Court has favored national uniformity of standards to protect national uniform market in
preemption and forum allocation cases); Note, New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption:
An Empirical Study of Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 1604, 1619 (2007) (arguing that courts frequently find preemption in cases of statutory ambiguity,
despite the judicial presumption against preemption).
15. This Article focuses on local rather than state measures because although the effects of
interstate competition have been critical to the development of environmental law, generally, local
action represents the appropriate scale for integrating the effects of the kind of interlocal competition
discussed below. Moreover, the city itself represents an important but often unacknowledged player in
federal governance. Indeed, despite its centrality to the national economy, "the city has been all but
invisible in the narrative and doctrine of the national common market." Richard C. Schragger, Cities,
Economic Development and the Free Trade Constitution, 94 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1094 (2008).
16. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (describing the balance between
legitimate local government interests and the need to not burden interstate commerce).
17. See infra Part I.C. I.
18. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 449 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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an interpretive space in which courts can construe local initiatives. For
one thing, competition for mobile citizen-consumers with preferences
for "green" living casts governments in a marketing role even in their
policymaking; citizen-consumers today concern themselves not only
with local environmental quality, but also the role the locality plays in
global environmental politics. In addition, there are specific economic
consequences to local climate action that implicate a municipality's
governmental and proprietary concerns. At the same time, large
business corporations are acting increasingly like market regulators:
Wal-Mart's toy safety and product labeling standards have a greater
regulatory effect than any individual state could.
This convergence of the proprietary and governmental poses a
challenge and an opportunity: The theory of interlocal competition,
which analogizes municipalities to businesses to derive concepts of
efficient regulation, has been prevalent in environmental law scholarship
for just about as long as the MPE doctrine, which grants special status to
municipalities acting like businesses to empower a degree of local
autonomy, has been in existence. But the two have lead parallel lives.
What happens when their paths finally converge?
This Article's answer is that a new test may be invoked to determine
whether the MPE applies to an environmental ceiling preemption.
Under my test, the MPE should apply to local governments when they
are undertake an environmental initiative in an area of traditional local
concern; within the scope of a comprehensive plan for sustainability or
climate change action; and the initiative will neither substantially
interfere with the purposes of the imposed ceiling nor substantially
externalize costs.
Part II of this Article explores the MPE's evolution in dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, recounts the essentials of preemption
doctrine and the federalization-devolution debate in environmental law,
explicates the difference between floors and ceilings, and examines the
MPE's application in preemption analyses. Part III provides a brief
overview of state and local climate change initiatives and expands the
definition of "market participant" by focusing on the interpretive space
created by the proprietary-governmental distinction. This Part also
looks at the social construction of "place" and the salience of "green"
branding to the creation of local identity. In the end, the Part III sets
forth this Article's test, which recognizes both the value of "place
competition" and the valid concerns behind federal ceilings. Part IV
summarizes the preemption implications of ACESA and applies the test
to three cases that are likely to remain unanswered by the bill.
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II. THE INVENTION OF THE MODERN MARKET PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION
A state or local government acting as a "market participant," as
opposed to a "market regulator," is unencumbered by the prohibitions of
the dormant Commerce Clause' 9 and federal preemption.2 ° Yet, an
essential indeterminacy has long plagued the MPE, inherent to the
analytic distinction between local governments acting in their
proprietary and governmental capacities. 21 The distinction derives from
an archaic, now largely abandoned, court-created test that held local
governments liable in tort when the action giving rise to the damage was
proprietary, and immune from such liability when the action was
governmental.22 The test may differ when applied in the context of
either constitutionally protected individual rights or dormant Commerce
Clause limitations, 23 but the underlying uncertainty remains. 24  There
has never been a definite, bright-line principle discerning what kind of
activity constitutes a proprietary as opposed to a governmental action;
what purposes are appropriate for a proprietor as opposed to a
government to undertake; or whether an action need be something a
19. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93 (1984); White v. Mass.
Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 206-08 (1983); Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436-37; Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976). White is the only one of these cases to address local
action; there is no question, however, that local governments can qualify as market participants. See
also Big Country Foods, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 952 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1992).
20. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of the Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders & Contractors of
Mass/R.I., Inc. (Boston Harbor), 507 U.S 218, 227 (1993) (justifying application of MPE, somewhat
unhelpfully, by stating "pre-emption doctrines apply only to state regulation"); cf Hydrostorage, Inc. v.
N. Cal. Boilermakers Local Joint Apprenticeship Comm., 891 F. 2d 719, 730 (9th Cir. 1989) (dictum
suggesting exception does not apply outside dormant Commerce Clause context).
21. See Michael Wells & Walter Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L. REV. 1073 (1980) (analyzing early market participant cases in context of
proprietary-governmental distinction).
22. See Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531, 539-40 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842); County of
Nassau v. South Farmingdale Water Dist., 405 N.Y.S. 2d 742, 744-46 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978)
(discussing historic development of distinction in New York State law); see also, 2 SANDRA M.
STEVENSON, ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 35.02 (2d ed.2009) (counting seven states that
have retained common law test versus thirty five that have repudiated it); Murray Seasongood,
Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test, 22 U. VA. L. REV. 910
(1936), reprinted in 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 469 (1984); Ruth Cook, Comment, Postscript: Tracing the
Governmental-Proprietary Test, 53 U. CtN. L. REV. 561 (1984).
23. See Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 21, at 1121.
24. One commentator has tried to characterize the distinction as:
A governmental function is supposedly one connected with the governing aspects of the
locality's existence: the passing of legislation, the handing down of judicial
decisions .... Proprietary functions are, on the other hand, not uniquely suited to
governmental rendition; they may equally well be conducted by private enterprise, and
often are so performed.
OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 13 (2d ed. 2001).
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private party would be capable of performing.25
Of course, the market participant-market regulator distinction is not
precisely the same as the proprietary-governmental distinction.26
Nonetheless, the two frequently bleed one into the other, and the
questions of form, purpose, and effect recur equally in both.
Importantly, however, I do not argue that the MPE should be abolished
for lack of clarity, any more than I argue that it is perfectly coherent; I
do not find anything unique in the flexibility the MPE grants to courts.
Rather, taking the doctrine as it lies, I find valid consequentialist and
expressivist arguments for its revision as against environmental ceiling
preemption.
This Part traces the MPE's development through its application in
dormant Commerce Clause and preemption contexts, sorting through the
normative theories that guide courts and commentators. The image that
emerges remains, at some level, indeterminate; however, the progression
is trending toward recognizing and accounting for the simultaneity of
regulatory and proprietary functions and purposes. This simultaneity is
an important element in local climate change and sustainability
initiatives, and ultimately justifies their inclusion under the MPE.
A. The Evolving Role of Government Action Under the Dormant
Commerce Clause
Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate
interstate commerce.27 Courts have long understood this power to
include a "negative" or "dormant" aspect that prohibits states and local
governments from enacting laws that either discriminate against or place
an undue burden on interstate trade. 28  The fundamental purpose of the
25. See, e.g., Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955) (calling government-
proprietary distinction a "quagmire that has long plagued the law of municipal corporations"); Benjamin
N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REv. 113, 120, 126 (1921) (comparing proprietary-
government doctrine to driftwood cluttering the waves).
26. Momingstar Water Users Ass'n v. Farmington Mun. Sch. Dist. No. 5, 901 P.2d 725, 734
(N.M. 1995) (concluding that governmental-proprietary distinction was of no legal significance in
settling water services contract dispute); see also Dan T. Coenen, The Impact of the Garcia Decision on
the Market-Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1995 U. ILL L. REv. 727, 740-42
[hereinafter Coenen, The Impact of the Garcia Decision] (asserting that critical distinction is not between
"'governmental' and 'proprietary' activities" but between "market participants" and "market
regulators"); Swin Res. Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting that "the
distinction between market participant and market regulator is problematic").
27. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
28. Although the term "dormant Commerce Clause" was first employed in Justice Frankfurter's
dissenting opinion in Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 547 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), the
implication that the Commerce Clause limits state and local authority dates back to the early-mid-
nineteenth century. See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (holding
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dormant Commerce Clause has been to forge and sustain a unified
national market, and to protect against overt forms of economic
29protectionism.   Although its constitutional basis has been both
challenged30 and denied,31 it remains a vital doctrine.
As a rule, state or local laws facially discriminate when they regulate
extraterritorially or amount to "simple economic protectionism"; in
those cases they are subject to a "virtually per se rule of invalidity."
32
Where state or local laws are not discriminatory on their face but
nonetheless "place an undue burden on interstate commerce," they are
subject to the balancing test first enunciated in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc.: "Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. 33
The Supreme Court's treatment of solid waste management under the
dormant Commerce Clause is a frame for the concomitant evolution of
Pennsylvania law imposing fee on ships entering or leaving Port of Philadelphia without hiring a local a
pilot did not violate Commerce Clause); Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245,
252 (1829) (act authorizing mining company to build a dam was not "repugnant to the power to regulate
commerce in its dormant state"). For a detailed review of the doctrine's evolution over the years, see
Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 417, 427-48 (2008).
29. Am. Trucking Ass'n v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 433 (2005) (discriminatory
local regulation risks "jeopardizing the welfare of the Nation as a whole by placing burdens on the flow
of commerce across its borders that commerce wholly within those borders would not bear") (internal
quotes omitted); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803 (1976) ("[T]his Nation is a
common market in which state lines cannot be made barriers to the free flow of both raw materials and
finished goods in response to the economic laws of supply and demand."); see also Viet D. Dinh,
Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2110 (2000) (claiming that dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence rests on "uniquely federal interest in maintaining national unity and uniformity in
interstate economic regulation"); Norman R. Williams, The Foundations of the American Common
Market, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 409 (2008) (arguing that "virtual representation" and "anti-
protectionism" theories of dormant Commerce Clause miss the mark and proposing "deliberative
equality" theory as normative justification).
30. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330,
348 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring) (admitting to willingness to "enforce" dormant Commerce Clause
only where there is facial discrimination against interstate commerce or a state law "indistinguishable
from a type of law previously held unconstitutional by the Court").
31. See United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 349 (Thomas, J., concurring); Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed
Economics of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1191 (1998); Martin H. Redish
& Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism,
1987 DuKE L.J. 569 (1987); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE
L.J. 425 (1982).
32. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992); H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., v. Du Mond,
336 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1949).
33. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (invalidating application of Arizona
statute that required cantaloupes grown in-state to be packaged in-state).
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the MPE, and shows why the MPE ought to be applied to local climate
change initiatives. It illuminates the Court's ability to distinguish facial
discrimination from legitimate local action, and to balance incidental
effects against actual burdens on the national market-an analytic
approach alien to ceiling preemption analysis. It also introduces the
Court's increasing recognition of the autonomy to be afforded local
governments acting in a public-private role.
34
Solid waste management is "a typical and traditional concern of local
government."' 35 Indeed, "it has been settled law that garbage collection
and disposal is a core function of local government in the United
States."36  Nonetheless, when New Jersey, suffering from a glut of
landfills serving the waste disposal needs of New York City and
Philadelphia, banned importing solid waste, the Supreme Court struck
the ban down as a paradigmatic example of "parochial legislation."
37
New Jersey's otherwise laudable goals-preserving open space and
protecting the health and safety of its residents-were irrelevant to the
Court's analysis: "[W]hatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may not
be accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming
from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their
origin, to treat them differently. 38
Subsequently, in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, the
Court struck down an ordinance passed by a New York town that
required all solid waste generated within the town to pass through a
privately owned and operated transfer station before entering the
interstate market (a so-called flow control law).39  The five-judge
majority categorized the ordinance as "just one more instance of local
processing requirements that we long have held invalid., 40 The majority
also voiced concern over the favoritism shown by the legislation to the
local owner of the waste transfer facility.4 ! Yet, as both Justice
34. Another version of this story, imaginatively reconstructing the litigators' strategies, is at
Kenneth L. Karst, From Carbone to United Haulers: The Advocates' Tales, 2007 SuP. CT. REV. 237
(2007).
35. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 346; see also United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid
Waste Mgmt. Auth., 261 F.3d 245, 264 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calebresi, J., concurring), aJfd, 550 U.S. 330.
36. USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir. 1995)
37. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978); see also Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322 (1979) (striking down Oklahoma law that prohibited the export of natural minnows).
38. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27. For a critique of the national market in trash and an
exploration of its environmental justice impacts, see Kirsten Engel, Reconsidering the National Market
in Solid Waste: Trade-Offs in Equity, Efficiency, Environmental Protection, and State Autonomy, 73
N.C.L. REv. 1481 (1995).
39. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
40. 1d. at 391 (citing to string of processing requirement cases).
41. Id. at 392.
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O'Connor's concurrence and Justice Souter's dissent argued, the tag of
"facial discrimination" did not fit the flow control law quite right-the
favoritism shown the "single local proprietor" was not specific to out-of-
state competitors.42 In the absence of a discriminatory motive, Justice
O'Connor applied the Pike balancing test, finding that the incidental
effect on commerce outweighed the putative local benefit. 43  Justice
Souter also applied the Pike test, and came to the opposite conclusion,
finding that both the purpose and structure of the ordinance made clear
that the private company was merely a "municipal agent" of the plan.
44
Then, in United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Management Authority, the Court upheld a flow control ordinance that
directed waste within two counties in New York to a government-owned
landfill.45  In finding the ordinance nondiscriminatory, the Court
distinguished local governments from private businesses, noting
government's "responsibility of protecting the health, safety, and
,,46 tawelfare of its citizens, and that a law favoring local government may
have "any number of legitimate goals unrelated to protectionism.'' 47
Accordingly, the Court applied the Pike balancing test, and found that
the public benefits of the ordinance outweighed any incidental burden it
imposed on interstate commerce.48
After United Haulers, it is easy to conclude that the Carbone dissent
carried the day. Once the Court was satisfied that neither protectionist
motives nor local favoritism lurked behind the flow control plan, the
value of the local benefits was equal to the value of the unified market.
This is an important lesson for ceiling preemption analysis: "The
Commerce Clause significantly limits the ability of States and localities
to regulate or otherwise burden the flow of interstate commerce, but it
does not elevate free trade above all other values., 4 9 Thus, although the
Commerce Clause does not prohibit ceiling preemption, courts should be
cautious not to assume they are absolute. The simultaneously
representative and proprietary nature of some local governments
42. Id. at 404, 411.
43. Id. at 405-06 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 412, 423 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the state had ordered the town to deal with
illegal dumping, and the town retained an option to purchase the facility for $1 after five years).
45. 550 U.S. 330, 334 (2007).
46. Id. at 342.
47. Id. at 343. It bears noting, here, that the counties did not raise the MPE as an affirmative
defense to the challenge. Id. at 363 (Alito, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, at least a few members of the
current Court appear to understand the decision in United Haulers in the light of the MPE. See infra
notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
48. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 346.
49. Id. at 344 (quoting Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986)).
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demands greater deference than currently afforded by ceiling preemption
analysis.
B. The Market Participant Exception and the Dormant Commerce
Clause
The introduction of the MPE to dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence is generally traced to Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap.
50
There, the Court upheld a subsidy program for processing abandoned
cars, or "hulks," that included differing documentation requirements for
in-state and out-of-state processors, which made it more difficult for out-
of-state processors to collect the proffered "bounty. 51 Subsequently, in
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, the Court validated South Dakota favoring in-state
purchasers of cement manufactured at a state-owned cement plant.52
The Court offered several justifications for its decision, which have
framed subsequent analyses: broad federalism concerns involving states'
ability to "structure relations exclusively with their own citizens" and
the desire to allow for "effective and creative programs for solving local
problems and distributing government largesse"; 53 a principle of
"evenhandedness" that grants states the same freedom to choose among
trading partners as private market actors; 54  and concern about
institutional competence. 5
In White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc.,
the Court upheld an executive order requiring any firm working on
public construction projects in Boston to ensure that Boston residents
made up at least half of the finn's work force,56 finding that everyone
affected was essentially "working for the city."' 57 The following year, in
South-Central Timber Development Corp. v. Wunnicke, the Court
rejected an Alaska law that required buyers of state-owned timber to
process the timber in the state prior to export.58 Justice White, writing
for a four-judge plurality, distinguished the case from Reeves by noting
50. The application of the proprietary-governmental distinction in dormant Commerce Clause
cases can be traced back further, to "a single line of cases involving challenges to state purchasing or
contracting requirements favoring in-state over out-of state interests." Wells & Hellerstein, supra note
21 at 1122 (citing to state cases dating back to the late nineteenth century).
51. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 799-800 (1976).
52. 447 U.S. 429, 446-47 (1980).
53. Id. at 441.
54. Id. at 439.
55. Id.
56. 460 U.S. 204, 206 (1983).
57. Id. at 211 n.7.
58. 467 U.S. 82, 84 (1984).
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the presence of foreign commerce (much of the timber was destined for
Japan), a natural resource, and restrictions on resale. 59 He also declared
in no uncertain terms that the MPE after White retained limits on a
locality's spending power: "[T]he doctrine is not carte blanche to
impose any conditions that the State has the economic power to
dictate. 60
Even still, "[t]he precise contours of the market-participant doctrine
have yet to be established., 61 Indeed, despite more than thirty years of
judicial tinkering, what it means to be a "market participant" remains an
open question-a fact that has not gone unnoticed by legal scholars.62
Most prominently, Dan Coenen has endeavored to divine and distill the
normative theories embedded in the case law.63 In "Untangling the
Market Participant Exception," Professor Coenen articulated four "key
justifications":
* The "reap what you sow" or "Lockean labor-desert" principle:
General notions of fairness support state governments'
favoring state residents with the state's largess. 64
* Federalism values-including the values of local
59. Id. at 96.
60. Id. at 97.
61. Id. at 93.
62. See, e.g., Norman R. Williams, Taking Care of Ourselves: State Citizenship, the Market, and
the State, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 470 (2008) (referring to "daunting task" of dissecting "doctrinal
disarray" of the MPE); Ethan Yale & Brian Galle, Muni Bonds and the Commerce Clause after United
Haulers, 115 TAX NOTES 1037, 1040 & n.34 (2007) (calling MPE "undertheorized"); David S. Bogen,
The Market Participant Doctrine and the Clear Statement Rule, 29 SEATTLE UNIV. L. R. 543, 546
(2006) (suggesting court rationales for MPE are "conclusory or inadequately explained"); Peter D.
Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for
Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377 (1996); Barton B. Clark, Comment, Give 'Em Enough Rope: States,
Subdivisions and the Market Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 60 U. CHI. L.
REV. 615, 621 n.37 (1993) (citing to articles); Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market Participant
Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395 (1989) [hereinafter Coenen,
Untangling]; Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (1988); Donald
H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1194, 1198 (1986), Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial
Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563 (1983); Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship " and Interstate Equality,
48 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 491 (1981); Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 21, at 1136.
63. See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE
L.J. 965 (1998) [hereinafter Coenen, Business Subsidies]; Dan T. Coenen, State User Fees and the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 50 VAND. L. REV. 795 (1997); Coenen, The Impact of the Garcia Decision,
supra note 26; Coenen, Untangling, supra note 62.
64. Coenen, Untangling, supra note 62, at 409 n.98, 421-26. This principle was emphasized by
Kirsten Engel, who argued that the "reap what you sow" rationale is at the center of the Court's
enforcement of the MPE. Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based
Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L. Q. 243, 334-42
(1999) (proposing expansion of MPE to include renewable portfolio standards). Previously, the
principle stood at the core of Jonathan Varat's analysis. See Varat, supra note 62, at 523.
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experimentation and responsiveness to local preferences-
suggest deference to states (and presumably, by extension,
their subdivisions) regarding the distribution of their
nonnatural resources.65
" Marketplace decisions by government actors represent a lesser
threat to the dormant Commerce Clause goal of a unified
national market than do regulatory decisions.
66
" The Constitution's text and history are limited to regulatory
decisions that interfere with free trade.
67
There are, predictably, other theories, as well. Lawrence Tribe has
argued that the MPE is grounded in the principle that "when the state is
creating commerce that would not otherwise exist, it has greater
freedom to shape that commerce than when it is merely intruding into a
previously existing private market." 68 Others have argued, as originally
proposed in Reeves, that evenhandedness should allow a government
acting in the market to behave as a private actor. 69  And then there are
those who believe that the exception itself is simply unwarranted,
unnecessary, or unwise.7 °
Professor Coenan's attempt to "untangle" the case law-an attempt
that derives much of its substance from Reeves-is a helpful exposition
that has set the parameters for subsequent analyses. 71  The cases
65. Coenen, Untangling, supra note 62, at 426-30.
66. Id. at 430-35; see also Regan, supra note 62, at 1193-94 (arguing that dormant Commerce
Clause values are at less risk because market participant programs generally involve state or local
spending and therefore are less likely to proliferate); Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 21, at 1128
(arguing that proprietary-government distinction can prove misleading in identifying state action that
does not sufficiently burden interstate commerce to implicate the clause).
67. Coenen, Untangling, supra note 62, at 435-38. Coenen includes a fifth "key justification,"
labeled "Institutional Considerations," which he describes in a general way and clearly considers
secondary to the other four.
68. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 146 (1985); see also Coenen, Untangling,
supra note 62, at 408-19 (discussing Prof Tribe's "commerce creation" theory).
69. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439 ("[S]tate proprietary activities may be, and often
are, burdened with the same restrictions imposed on private market participants.
Evenhandedness suggests that, when acting as proprietors, States should similarly share existing
freedoms from federal constraints .. " (footnote omitted)); see also Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310
U.S. 113, 127 (1940) ("Like private individuals and businesses, the Government enjoys the unrestricted
power to produce its own supplies, to determine those with whom it will deal, and to fix the terms and
conditions upon which it will make needed purchases."); cf Coenen, Untangling, supra note 62, at 421
(noting that the "inherent amorphousness of the evenhandedness justification, renders it of limited
significance"); Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 21, at 1129 (arguing that governmental-proprietary
distinction should not be allowed to accord special consideration to political interests).
70. See, e.g., Michael J. Polelle, A Critique of the Market Participation Exception, 15 WHITTIER
L. REV. 647 (1994); Karl Manheim, New-Age Federalism and the Market Participant Doctrine, 22
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 559 (1990); Theodore Y. Blumoff, The State Proprietary Exception to the Dormant
Commerce Clause: A Persistent Nineteenth Century Anomaly, 9 S. ILL. U. L.J. 73 (1984).
71. Norman Williams recently surveyed a number of theories which at least invoke Coenen's.
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analyzed there, however, involved state spending and the sale of state-
produced or state-owned goods. More recently, the Court has struggled
to decide whether the MPE applies to another form of governmental
action, the more obviously regulatory creation of state tax exemptions
and credits. The result has been an expansion-or at the very least a
possible expansion--of the MPE's conception and application.
At first, it appeared that tax credits did not fall within the MPE. In
New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, the Court roundly rejected
Ohio's argument that a credit for ethanol manufactured within the state
qualified as a market participation.72 In unison, the Court declared that
"the assessment and computation of taxes [is] a primeval governmental
activity," and therefore the ethanol credit, though it ultimately produced
a subsidy, "cannot plausibly be analogized to the activity of a private
purchaser., 73 Similarly, in Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison, the Court struck down a tax exemption granted by Maine to
charitable organizations within the state that served primarily in-state
residents: "A tax exemption is not the sort of direct state involvement in
the market that falls within the market-participant doctrine. 74
Except, perhaps, when it is. In Department of Revenue of Kentucky v.
Davis, the Court held that exempting interest on state-issued municipal
bonds, while taxing interest on other bonds, did not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause.75 The split decision left the MPE in flux. Part III.B
of the opinion, penned by Justice Souter, and garnering two other votes,
found the MPE applied because the state was acting in "dual roles," as
both a regulator of the tax system and a participant in the bond market.76
In contrast to the argument that earlier cases involved a lack of
regulation,77 Justice Souter compared the dual role to the situations in
Alexandria Scrap, White and, most intriguingly, United Haulers:
In each of these cases the commercial activities by the governments
and their regulatory efforts complemented each other in some way, and
Ultimately, Professor Williams proposes that what he terms the "investment capture theory" provides
the best defense. Williams, supra note 62, at 482-93.
72. 486 U.S. 269, 276 (1988)
73. Id. at 277-78.
74. 520 U.S. 564, 593 (1997).
75. 553 U.S. 328 (2008).
76. Id. at 343-48. For an analysis of the pros and cons of the decision see Dan T. Coenen, The
Supreme Court's Municipal Bond Decision and the Market-Participant Exception to the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1179, 1185 (2009) [hereinafter Coenen, Municipal Bond] (arguing
that 1l1.B analysis "opens the door to both confusion and error in future applications of the dormant
Commerce Clause"). Coenen also examines the effects the decision might have on analysis of nontax
regulation. See id. at 1198-1203. But see Robert J. Firestone, Kentucky Bond Case: A Logical
Application of the Market Participant Doctrine, 46 ST. TAX NOTES 237 (2007).
77. See Coenen, Municipal Bond, supra note 76, at 1187-93.
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in each of them the fact of tying the regulation to the public object of the
foray into the market was understood to give the regulation a civic
objective different from the discrimination traditionally held to be
unlawful. ... .In sum. . .our cases on market participation joined with
regulation (the usual situation) prescribe exceptional treatment for this
direct governmental activity in commercial markets for the public's
benefit.78
Of course, Justice Souter's MPE analysis did not carry a plurality;
Part III.A did, though, and was nonetheless congruent with its logic.
Without reference to the MPE, Part III.A followed United Haulers in
treating "traditional government functions" as special creatures under
the dormant Commerce Clause, "not susceptible to
standard. . scrutiny. 79 For his part, Professor Coenen has proposed
that this pronouncement, together with United Haulers, announces a
new rule, which he labels the "state-self-promotion exception."
' 80
Alternatively, the principle has been referred to as a "government entity
exemption." 81 However phrased, both of the Court's characterizations
of government action-the "dual role" invoked in II.B and the
"traditional function" relied upon in III.A-raise the same questions of
form, purpose, and effect that have plagued the
proprietary-governmental distinction for more than 160 years. The
difference is that while the "traditional function" label adopted by the
majority maintains the distinction on embedded and undefined terms,
"dual role" makes the interpenetration of government and proprietor
explicit and in so doing, calls for renewed consideration of the MPE's
scope and reach.
78. Davis, 553 U.S. at 347; see also Coenen, Business Subsidies, supra note 63, at 1014 (noting
that the subsidies are meant "to regulate the flow of business by promoting in-state production");
Pollele, supra note 70, at 658 (stating that there is no logical basis to differentiate between subsidies and
regulation); Gergen, supra note 62, at 1144 ("If downstream restraints are different from subsidies in
any real respect, it is because their costs are hidden.").
79. Davis, 553 U.S. at 341. The analysis, here, seems to proceed from Justice Powell's dissent in
Reeves. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 449 (1980) ("If a public enterprise undertakes an
integral [operation] in areas of traditional government functions, the Commerce Clause is not directly
relevant." (internal quotes and citations omitted) (alteration in original)).
80. Dan T. Coenen, Where United Haulers Might Take Us: The Future of the State-Self-
Promotion Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause Rule, 95 IOWA L. REV. 541 (2009).
81. Leading Case, Dorman Commerce Clause - State Taxation of Municipal Bonds, 122 HARV.
L. REv. 276 (2008). In either event, the carve-out for "traditional government functions" has raised
some hackles, as it appears to revive a category thought put to rest in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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C. The Market Participant Exception and Preemption
In recent years a number of articles have analyzed the validity of state
and local climate change initiatives under the dormant Commerce
Clause.82 Whereas those analyses apply to initiatives that might conflict
with the Constitution's goal of a unified national market, preemption
applies where Congress has taken legislative action. 83 The current draft
of ACESA imposes a number of ceilings, and existing environmental
laws have already limited what local initiatives can do. This subpart
therefore turns to the MPE's application to ceiling preemption.
84
1. Preemption Doctrine and the Floor-Ceiling Divide
Preemption doctrine relies on the principle that federal law is the
"supreme Law of the Land., 85  The circumstances that give rise to
preemption are familiar, if enigmatic. 86  Preemption can be either
express or implied.87 Express preemption derives from the explicit
language of a statute. 88 The scope of express preemption is presumably,
though not necessarily, described by the preemption clause's language.89
82. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 12, at 892-900; Engel, supra note 64.
83. Administrative agencies may also have the power to preempt when Congress has afforded
them such power. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009); Hillsborough County v. Automated
Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985); see also Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency
Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695 (2008).
84. Regardless of the language of present drafts of both ACESA and Boxer-Kerry, the
lawmaking is far from over, and the trend toward preemption as a statutory fixture is undeniable. See
JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW: LEGISLATION, REGULATION
AND LITIGATION 2 (2006) (calculating that of approximately 350 express preemption statutes about half
have been enacted since 1980); JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, CONGRESSIONAL PREEMPTION: REGULATORY
FEDERALISM 1, 7 (2005) (noting that of the 522 preemption statutes enacted by Congress between 1790
and 2004, 355 were passed after 1965, and 41 between 2000 and 2004).
85. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
86. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000) (challenging the validity and
utility of the well-trod preemption categories). Notably, preemption of municipal ordinances is
governed under the same standards as state law. Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597
(1991).
87. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992); Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983); see also
FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S.
Greve eds. 2009); PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE
QUESTION (William W. Buzbee ed. 2009).
88. Similarly, state regulatory flexibility may be encoded in a separate "savings clause." See.
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2006) (preserving state authority to adopt and enforce ambient air quality
standards more stringent than federal law); 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (water pollution); 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a)
(federally registered pesticides); 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1) (chemical substances); 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (solid
waste disposal); 16 U.S.C. § 1535(0 (takings of endangered species).
89. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484-85 (1996) ("[T]he purpose of Congress is the
852 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol.78
Because the question turns on the statute's language, courts will employ
traditional tools of statutory construction to delimit the reach of its
preemptive affect. 90 Thus, the purposes of the statute-as well as the
specific purposes of the preemption clause-are directly relevant to
determining whether a law should be preempted.
Implied preemption falls into two categories: field preemption and
conflict preemption. 91  Field preemption occurs where Congress
"completely occupies a given field" 92 and consequently displaces any
state or local law in the area.93  A court may properly infer field
preemption where the pervasiveness of the federal regulation precludes
supplementation, the federal interest in the field is sufficiently dominant,
or "the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character
of obligations imposed by it. . .reveal the same purpose. 94 Conflict
preemption may arise either where it is impossible to comply with both
federal and state or local law, or where the state or local law "stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress." 95  As with express preemption, the
question of implied preemption turns ultimately on congressional intent
and the purposes of the federal law.
Federalism concerns are at the heart of preemption doctrine, so there
is often said to be a "presumption against preemption." 96 Indeed, when
ultimate touch-stone in every preemption case." (internal quotations omitted)); Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530 n.27 (1992) (an understanding of the scope of a preemption provision
turns on "a fair understanding of congressional purpose").
90. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645, 655 (1995) (express preemption analysis begins with text of the provision and proceeds to the
structure and purpose of the act in which it occurs); see also Glicksman & Levy, supra note 7, at 586
n.33 (arguing that preemption cases fall within broader debate between textualist and intentionalist
schools of statutory construction).
91. The distinction between these categories is not necessarily "rigidly distinct." Crosby v. Nat'l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 n.6 (2000).
92. Pac. Gas, 461 U.S. at 213; see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236
(1947).
93. See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727
(2008).
94. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
95. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also, Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.
v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
96. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194-95 ("[W]e start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress." (internal quotes and citations omitted)); Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992) (federal statutes must be "construe[d] in light of the presumption
against the pre-emption of state police power regulations."); Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S.
597, 605 (1991) (applying presumption to local law). A series of Rehnquist court preemption decisions
have inspired an ongoing debate regarding the seriousness with which courts treat the presumption. See,
e.g., Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (preempting state products liability
common law claims under obstacle preemption theory despite express preemption and savings clauses);
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preemption is invoked to prevent a state or municipality from wielding
its traditional police powers, congressional intent to displace that
authority must be "clear and manifest. ' 97  Setting the terms and
conditions governing state and municipal contracts constitutes one such
traditional police power; 98 protecting public health and the environment
is another.
99
Preemption doctrine, as applied to environmental law, is situated in
the broader policy debate between federalization and devolution.
Whether conceived, either descriptively or prescriptively, as
cooperative,1 °° contextual, 10 ' dynamic,
1°2 adaptive, 103  interactive, 104
iterative, 1°5 or polyphonic, 106 environmental law has long sought an
appropriate balance between a centralized scheme and local authority.107
This subpart summarizes this long-running debate, and shows how it
maps onto the argument regarding environmental floors and ceilings.
Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (preempting California law requiring insurance
companies doing business in the state to disclose Holocaust-era insurance policies); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L.
REV. 1313 (2004) (arguing Court masks policy choices behind rhetoric of preemption and states rights);
Calvin Massey, "Joltin' Joe has Left and Gone Away": The Vanishing Presumption Against
Preemption, 66 ALB. L. REV. 749 (2003); Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of
Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967 (2002).
97. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989). Articles arguing for a "clear statement"
rule on preemption include: Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve
the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (2008); David C. Vladeck, Preemption and
Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 95, 109 (2005); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a
Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1425 (2001).
98. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903).
99. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960) ("Legislation
designed to free from pollution the very air that people breathe clearly falls within the exercise of even
the most traditional concept of what is compendiously known as the police power.").
100. See Glicksman, supra note 4.
101. William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 108
(2005).
102. Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56
EMORY L. J. 159 (2006)
103. David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating
Environmental Regulatory Authority 45-46 (Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 07-23, 2007),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1016767.
104. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243
(2005).
105. Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 N.W. L. REV. 1097, 1099
(2009) (discussing process of "repeated, sustained, and dynamic lawmaking efforts" that treat states
differentially, with some granted status as "super-regulators" and put in the position of becoming first
movers in a given area).
106. ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009).
107. See Jonathan H. Adler, When is Two a Crowd? The Impact of Federal Action on State
Environmental Regulation, 31 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 67 (2007).
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Several dominant theories support traditional arguments in favor of
federalization, or centralization, of environmental law:' 0 8  First,
interstate externalities-for example, discharges from Milwaukee's
sewers into Lake Michigan causing bacterial contamination along the
Illinois shoreline, or air pollution from power plants in Ohio producing
acid rain in the Adirondack Mountains-requires a federal response.'
09
Second, federalization counteracts the problem of the race to the bottom,
in which subnational jurisdictions caught in a prisoner's dilemma lower
environmental standards to potentially harmful levels to attract
industry." 0  Third, there are legitimate arguments in favor of some
degree of federal uniformity in regulating products manufactured for and
distributed on a national scale,"' as uniform standards provide
economic efficiencies to regulated entities.11 2 Fourth, centralization can
108. For one alternative parsing of theories supporting centralization of environmental law, see
Jeremy Remy Nash, The Illusion of Devolution in Environmental Law, 38 URB. LAW. 1003 (2006)
(arguing that market failure and public choice explanations do not predict or justify federal ceilings).
109. In economics, externalities are spillover costs or adverse consequences imposed on
nonparties to a transaction. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of
Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L. J. 1196,
1215-16 (1977) (explaining that spillover costs are insufficiently accounted for in decentralized
governance); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2341 (1996) (arguing that federal law has not effectively addressed the problems arising from
interstate externalities); see also Brian T. Burgess, Note, Limiting Preemption in Environmental Law:
An Analysis of the Cost-Externalization Argument and California Assembly Bill 1493, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 258, 274-84 (2009) (discussing cost externalization as a possible justification for ceiling
preemption in climate change legislation).
110. The validity of this theory has been the subject of a long-running debate. See, e.g., Richard
L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom " Rationale for
Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1211 (1992) [hereinafter Revesz, Interstate
Competition]; Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in
Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 67 (1996); Kirsten
H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "To the Bottom"?, 48
HASTINGS L. J. 271 (1997); Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental
Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997) [hereinafter Revesz, A Response to
Critics]; Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115
HARV. L. REV. 553, 555-57 (2001) [hereinafter Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation].
For a more recent revival of the debate, see, for example, Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in
Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 139 (2005); Richard Webster, Federal
Environmental Enforcement: Is Less More?, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 303 (2007) (arguing race to
bottom exists in relation to enforcement).
111. Revesz, A Response to Critics, supra note 110, at 544 ("Uniformity ... can be desirable for
products with important economies of scale in production."); Alan Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation.
Capture, and Tort Law: The Regulatory Compliance Defense, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 6-10 (2000)
(discussing "inefficiencies" associated with disparate state standards); cf James E. Krier, On the
Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal System - and Why It Matters, 54 MD. L.
REV. 1226 (1995) (arguing that uniform standards under the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act had
proven "foolish").
112. But see Engel, supra note I10, at 369 (noting that uniform standards benefit industry by
stifling competition and freeing it from having to satisfy diversity of requirements); Glicksman & Levy,
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effectively pool resources for gathering technical information,
generating scientific knowledge, creating durable rules, and providing
for enforcement.11 3  Fifth, centralization may enable a greater diversity
of interest group participation, as those shut out from local lawmaking
may gain greater access at the federal level. 114  Sixth, federalization can
overcome the NIMBY (not in my backyard) phenomenon typical in
siting hazardous waste disposal sites and transportation routes, 115 and
other locally undesirable land uses (LULUs)." 6 Finally, federalization
may respond to the sense of a national moral imperative for
environmental protection. "17
On the other side of the debate, several dominant theories justify
devolution, or decentralization, of environmental law. First,
decentralization may enable decisionmaking that is both more
democratic 118 and more responsive to local preferences." 9  Second,
decentralization is often said to promote regulatory and policy
innovation that can then trickle up to the national level; in this regard,
states and localities are often "laboratories for experimentation."'
120
Third, decentralization may enable decisionmaking that is tailored more
narrowly to variable local environmental conditions.'12  Fourth,
supra note 7, at 599 n.95 (noting that uniform standards are "more concerned with reducing regulatory
burdens than improving the effectiveness of environmental regulation").
113. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 105.
114. See Stewart, supra note 109, at 1213-15; Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental
Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 598 (1996); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure
of Local Government Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1990); cf Hills, supra note 97.
115. See MICHAEL B. GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK: FEAR AND FAIRNESS IN
ToxIC AND NUCLEAR WASTE SITING (1994).
116. See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495 (1994)
(discussing NIMBY responses to waste disposal facility, low-income housing and social service
centers); Barak D. Richman & Christopher Boerner, A Transaction Cost Economizing Approach to
Regulation: Understanding the NIMBY Problem and Improving Regulatory Responses, 23 YALE J. ON
REG. 29 (2006).
117. See Stewart, supra note 109, at 1221-22.
118. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Good for Localism? The Localist Case for
Federal Regimes, 21 J.L. & POLITICS 187, 189-95 (2005) (distinguishing "democratic decentralization"
from "bureaucratic decentralization").
119. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Making Environmental Regulation More Adaptive Through
Decentralization: The Case For Subsidiarity, 52 KAN. L. REV. 1377 (2004).
120. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country."); David L. Markell, States As Innovators: It's Time for a New Look to our "Laboratories
of Democracy" in the Effort to Improve our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV.
347 (1994).
121. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 109, at 1219-20; Esty, supra note 114, at 606-07; Krier, supra
note 11l; see also Andreen, supra note 9, at 270-71, 296-97 (detailing variations in climate change's
ongoing and predicted regional impact and connecting it to benefit of establishing federal floor). In fact,
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decentralization can enable adaptive management or other
experimentalist or "new governance" regimes.' 22 Fifth, decentralization
might spur interjurisdictional competition, which can lead to
economically efficient regulation. 123
These values are apparent when compared side-by-side:
Centralization Values Decentralization Values
Addressing Externalities
Countering Race to the Bottom Competition -- Race to Top
Efficiency of Uniformity Efficient regulation
Innovations of Diversity
Resource Pooling Experimentalism/New
Government Regimes
Interest Group Diversity Increased Democracy
Combating NIMBYism Responding to Local
Environmental Concerns
National Moral Imperative Responding to Local Preferences
For many years, arguments on both sides focused on the normative
and consequentialist justifications for federal floors, such as those found
in the.Clean Air Act's National Air Ambient Air Quality Standards and
the Clean Water Act's Water Quality Standards. 124  This only made
sense; as "[i]n most areas focused on regulation of risks ... such as...
efforts to enhance public welfare through regulation of environmental,
occupational, and product risks, the protective one-way ratchet of floor
preemption, rather than complete preemption, has been the legislative
and regulatory norm."' 125  In the last few years, however, ceiling
a number of detailed assessments have been undertaken to direct climate change adaptation strategies.
See, e.g., CALIFORNIA NAT. RES. AGENCY, 2009 CALIFORNIA CLIMATE ADAPTATION STRATEGY (2009),
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2009publications/CNRA- 1000-2009-027/CNRA- 1000-2009-027-F.PDF;
New YORK CITY PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE RISK INFORMATION (2009),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc203/downloads/pdf/nycclimate-change-report.pdf.
122. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty
Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 943-45 (2003); Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Environmental Lawyering in the Age of Collaboration, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 555, 555 (2002);
Charles Sabel et al., Beyond Backyard Environmentalism, in BEYOND BACKYARD ENVIRONMENTALISM
3 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds. 2000); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 3-8 (1997). But cf, Douglas NeJaime, When New
Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L. J. 323 (2009).
123. See, e.g., Revesz, Interstate Competition, supra note 110.
124. Indeed, the literature referenced in note 110, supra, focused largely on this precise issue. See
also Stewart, supra note 109 (articulating classic arguments for and against federalization of floors).
125. Buzbee, supra note 7, at 1552.
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preemption has appeared in an increasing number of areas. 126  As a
result, the federalism debate has turned to the question of federal
ceilings, particularly, though not exclusively, in relation to climate
change.' 2 7  Under the existing language of ACESA, federal climate
change ceilings could be express, implied as a matter of field preemption
(either due to the establishment of a cap-and-trade emission trading
regime or on its relation to foreign policy), 128 or implied as a matter of
obstacle preemption. 1
29
In weighing the desirability of ceiling preemption, commentators
have focused on national economic efficiency and NIMBYism, on one
side of the scale, and the core federalism values of local autonomy, on
the other. 130  On a policy level, then, the evaluation of ceiling
preemption pares out a number of the values from the broader
federalization-devolution debate.
126. Id. at 1568-76 (describing "unitary federal choice ceilings" in GHG regulation, LNG
terminal siting, state common law and Department of Homeland Security proposal to preempt regulation
of chemical facilities); Sharkey, supra note 8, at 227-28 (noting attempts to preempt by preamble
standards for mattress bedding and SUV roofs); Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation,
supra note 110, at 633 (noting Food Quality Protection Act sets ceiling over local tolerances for
pesticide residue); Nash, supra note 108 (using state superlien statutes from the 1980s, the Acid Rain
trading program and the controversy surrounding California's attempt to regulate GHG gases from
automobiles as examples of federal ceilings in operation).
127. For an example of a nonclimate change-related analysis, see Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption
and Privacy, 118 YALE L. J. 902 (2009) (examining federalization/devolution argument and
ceiling/floor divide in relation to possible omnibus federal privacy law).
128. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 7, at 583 (noting that field preemption acts as both a floor
and a ceiling); Farber, supra note 12, at 904-10 (discussing foreign affairs preemption and applying it to
climate change); see also Sapna Desai, Note, Genocide Funding: The Constitutionality of State
Divestment Statutes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 669, 690-92 (2009) (discussing applicability of MPE to
foreign dormant Commerce Clause).
129. It is difficult to see how a ceiling could emerge from the conflict prong that relies on
impossibility of complying with both federal and state law. Any more stringent state or local standard
would obviously satisfy a more lax federal one.
130. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 7; Glicksman & Levy, supra note 7; see also NAT'L ASS'N OF
CLEAN AIR AGENCIES, CONFERENCE MATERIALS FOR DEFINING THE ROLE OF STATES AND LOCALITIES
IN FEDERAL GLOBAL WARMING LEGISLATION 9-14 (2008), available at
http://www.4cleanair.org/documents/GWConferenceMaterials.pdf (outlining justifications and benefits
of state flexibility).
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Federalization Values Devolution Values
In Favor of Ceilings Against Ceilings
Efficiencies of Uniformity Innovations of Diversity
Combating NIMBYism Responding to Local Preferences
I Responding to Local Conditions
I Race to Top
At the level of judicial review, however, a court considering a ceiling
preemption challenge to a local initiative will not weigh these values
against one another. In an article forecasting potential climate change
preemption struggles, Daniel Farber suggests that "the best advice for
lawyers in analyzing preemption problems is to probe the legislative
materials and the extent to which the state statute would have a practical
effect on the implementation of the federal statute."' 131  But courts'
application of ceiling preemption is far more stark than Farber's advice
admits: If Congress intended uniformity, then, under both express and
implied preemption analyses, there can be no regulatory diversity
catering to local preferences, responding to local environmental
conditions, or a race to the top; nor is there room to look at federal
scheme's impact. 132 The MPE affords another chance to balance these
values in court.
2. Labor Law: The MPE in a Statutory Scheme
The market participant exception to preemption has arisen most
pervasively in cases challenging state and local actions under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 133 Although the NLRA contains
no express preemption provisions, the Supreme Court has implied
conflict or obstacle preemption, and laid out two separate tests for
addressing preemption under the statute. 134  Garmon preemption
131. Farber, supra note 12, at 903.
132. Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004), discussed
infra; Ass'n of Int'l Auto. Mfrs. v. Mass. Dep't Envtl. Prot., 208 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2000) (rejecting
argument that zero emissions vehicle fleet sales requirement was not a standard due to small impact
because "whether a regulation effects a small or great impact on overall emissions levels is a question of
degree, not one of kind."); see also Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of
Democracy, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1501, 1555 (2009) (noting "the extent to which the Court will
interpret the Supremacy Clause so broadly as to eliminate state tort law claims for relief without
Congress expressly saying so by finding the claims are state 'requirements' that conflict with federal
law."). But see Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 70 (2002) (stating that despite Congressional
interest in uniformity under the Federal Boat Safety Act, the statute's broad savings clause preserves
state tort law remedies).
133. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
134. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 475 U.S. 608, 623 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
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precludes state interference with the National Labor Relations Board's
interpretation and enforcement of the NLRA's "integrated scheme of
regulation."'1 35  Machinists preemption forbids regulating conduct that
Congress intended to be left open to free market forces.
136
The Supreme Court first construed the market participant exception to
limit Garmon preemption in the seminal Boston Harbor case. 137 There,
a state water authority had contracted for the construction of sewage
treatment and other facilities on Boston Harbor, which it would own and
operate, and had entered into a project labor agreement (PLA) that
recognized one entity as the exclusive bargaining agent of all employees
for the project. 138  The Court held the PLA exempt from preemption
because the purpose of the contract and the PLA was "to ensure an
efficient project that would be completed as quickly and effectively as
possible at the lowest cost," and the authority was therefore a
"proprietor." 39
Lower courts' treatment of the principle from Boston Harbor has
varied: While some courts have focused on whether the local law's
purpose is to set policy or is truly "proprietary," others have limited the
exception to purchases of goods and services, and still others have
struggled to discern the level of proof needed to demonstrate that a
private actor might behave the same as the government proposes to
act. 140  The Fifth Circuit synthesized these strands of analysis and
articulated the following test in Cardinal Towing:
First, does the challenged action essentially reflect the entity's own
interest in its efficient procurement of needed goods and services, as
measured by comparison with the typical behavior of private parties in
similar circumstances? Second, does the narrow scope of the challenged
action defeat an inference that its primary goal was to encourage a general
policy rather than address a specific proprietary problem? Both questions
seek to isolate a class of government interactions with the market that are
so narrowly focused, and so in keeping with the ordinary behavior of
(discussing how labor preemption developed from "a series of implications" regarding Congressional
intent).
135. Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 288-89
(1986); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)
136. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S.
132 (1976).
137. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of the Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders & Contractors of
Mass./R.I. (Boston Harbor), 507 U.S 218 (1993).
138. Id. at232.
139. Id.
140. See Roger C. Hartley, Preemption's Market Participant Immunity-A Constitutional
Interpretation: Implications for Living Wage and Labor Peace Policies, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 229,
233-36 (discussing lower courts' approaches and citing to cases).
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private parties, that a regulatory impulse can be safely ruled out. 
14 1
Following Cardinal Towing's reasoning, in Chamber of Commerce v.
Brown the Supreme Court struck down a California statute that
prohibited employers receiving state funds from using the state funds to
"assist, promote, or deter union organizing,"' 142 ruling that the statute
was impermissible under Machinists preemption. 143 The Court
dismissed the argument that California was acting as a market
participant in setting such limits, distinguishing the statute from the
contract in Boston Harbor because it was not "specifically tailored to
one particular job" nor a "legitimate response to state procurement
constraints or to local economic needs." 144  Notably, the statute's
preamble declared a broad labor purpose, and the statute allowed certain
funds to be used to facilitate voluntary agreements between labor and
management. 145
In ruling that a policy purpose disqualifies a government actor from
"market participation," Chamber of Commerce appears inconsistent with
Alexandria Scrap, Reeves, and White, where policy considerations were
obviously essential aspects of the challenged laws. Moreover, the
decision is perhaps irreconcilable with the "dual role" of the market
participant recognized by Justice Souter in Davis. Indeed, in the context
of state spending decisions, the assertion of a bright-line distinction
between market regulation and market participation, and between
governmental and proprietary actions, suggests "a false dichotomy.''
146
Given the multiplicity of policy motives (including abiding by budget
constraints), the bureaucracy of procurement requirements (which often
entail some of public review), and any number of other factors, state and
local spending measures do not fall neatly into either category.
Though my proposed MPE test assumes that Cardinal Towing and
Chamber of Commerce v. Brown are wrong in limiting market
participation to instances with no discernible policy motive, the
inconsistency between those decisions and the dormant Commerce
Clause cases highlights an important difference between the statutory
and constitutional contexts: "[b]ecause the market participant doctrine is
not a wholly freestanding doctrine, but rather a presumption about
141. Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v. City of Bedford, 180 F.3d 686, 693 (5th Cir. 1999);
see also Healthcare Ass'n of N.Y. State, Inc., v. Pataki, 471 F.3d 87, 109 (2d Cir. 2006).
142. Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2410 (2008).
143. Id. at 2415.
144. Id. (quoting Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282,
291 (1986)).
145. Id.
146. Id. at2421.
860
IT'S NOT EASY BEING GREEN
congressional intent, the doctrine may have a different scope under
different federal statutes."' 147  Accordingly, the NLRA's particular
concerns might have reasonably limited application of the MPE in the
specific instances above, whereas the concerns of environmental statutes
may call for a more expansive view.
3. Clean Air Acts: Fleet Rules and the MPE
In Engine Manufacturers Association v. South Coast Air Quality
Management District (SCAQMD), the Supreme Court invited courts to
consider the applicability of the MPE under the Clean Air Act.
148
There, the Court determined that "fleet rules" promulgated by a
California state agency were preempted by Section 209(a), which
prohibits states or their subdivisions from adopting or attempting to
enforce any state or local "standard relating to the control of emissions
from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines."' 149  The fleet
rules required certain public and private fleet operators150 to purchase or
lease alternative fuel vehicles or vehicles that met emissions standards
specified by the California Air Resources Board (CARB) when
replacing older vehicles. 151
The district court had held that the fleet rules were not "standard[s]"
because they regulated the purchase of vehicles that were otherwise
certified for sale: "Where a state regulation does not compel
manufacturers to meet a new emissions limit, but rather affects the
purchase of vehicles, as the Fleet Rules do, that regulation is not a
standard." 152 The Ninth Circuit had affirmed. 1
53
147. Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Maint. Dist., 498 F. 3d 1031, 1042 (9th Cir.
2007).
148. 541 U.S. 246 (2004) [hereinafter SCAQMD].
149. 42 U.S.C. 7543(a) (2006).
150. The fleets included street sweepers; passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and medium-duty
vehicles; public transit vehicles and urban buses; solid waste collection vehicles; airport passenger
transportation vehicles, including shuttles and taxicabs picking up airline passengers; and heavy-duty
on-road vehicles. SCAQMD, 541 U.S. at 249.
151. Id. at 249-50.
152. Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Maint. Dist., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1118 (C.D.
Cal. 2001), affid, 309 F.3d 550 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, 541 U.S. 246 (2004). The district issued this
ruling despite prior decisions by the First and Second Circuits preempting regulations requiring a given
percentage of new vehicles sold within the state be low- or zero-emission vehicles. See Ass'n of Int'l
Automobile Mfrs., Inc. v. Mass. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 208 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 2000); Am. Auto. Mfrs.
Ass'n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196, 200 (2d Cir. 1998). The district court found these cases distinguishable
because they addressed regulations pertaining to the sale of vehicles to the general population, rather
than the purchase of vehicles by select categories of fleet owners.
153. Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Maint. Dist., 309 F.3d 550, 551 (9th Cir. 2002),
vacated, 541 U.S. 246 (2004).
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In an 8-1 decision, the Court reversed. 154  Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, noted that "[a] command, accompanied by sanctions, that
certain purchasers may buy only vehicles with particular emission
characteristics is as much an 'attempt to enforce' a 'standard' as a
command, accompanied by sanctions, that a certain percentage of a
manufacturer's sales volume must consist of such vehicles."'155  Justice
Scalia, however, dangled an unanswered question in front of the parties
and the lower courts: "[W]hether some of the Fleet Rules (or some
applications of them) can be characterized as internal state purchase
decisions (and, if so, whether a different standard for pre-emption
applies)."'
156
On remand, the district court took the hint and found that the fleet
rules valid under the MPE insofar as they applied to state and local
governmental entities,157 and the Ninth Circuit again affirmed.158  The
issue of the MPE's application to private entities has not been resolved,
because the state agency announced that it would not enforce those
provisions. 1
59
The Ninth Circuit's remand opinion in SCAQMD does more than
simply affirm that the MPE applies to state and local government
purchases of low emission or hybrid vehicles. For one thing, it posits a
presumption against preemption of the MPE. 160  Perhaps more
importantly, it inculcates public policy considerations into the state's
interest in the "efficient procurement of needed goods and services, as
measured by comparison with the typical behavior of private parties in
similar circumstances."' 61  The court rejected four separate arguments
154. Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Maint. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 254-55 (2004). In a
solo dissent, Justice Souter argued that the presumption against preemption should apply as air pollution
is an area of traditionally local concern, the legislative history of the Clean Air Act was clear that the
preemption provision was intended to prevent states and local governments from limiting what
manufacturers could sell, and the scope of preemption would properly be limited to production mandates
imposed directly on manufacturers as a condition of sale. Id. at 259-66 (Souter, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 255 (majority opinion).
156. Id. at 259.
157. Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Maint. Dist., CV 00-09065 FMC (BQRx), 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45388 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2005). The court did not reach the issue of whether the
Fleet Rules were valid as applied to the private or federal entities, holding that the plaintiffs had brought
a facial challenge to the Rules, and that that challenge had been decided.
158. Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Maint. Dist., 498 F. 3d 1031, 1050 (9th Cir.
2007).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1042 (asking "whether the Act contains 'any express or implied indication by
Congress' that the presumption embodied by the market participant doctrine should not apply to
preemption under the Act") (quoting from Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of the Metro. Dist. v.
Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc. (Boston Harbor), 507 U.S. 218, 231 (1993)).
161. Id. at 1045 (quoting Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 463 F. 3d 1076, 1084 (9th Cir.
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that are relevant, here. 162  First, the court declared that the public
purpose of reducing air pollution was reasonably considered the decision
of a rational market actor. 163 Second, it found that the MPE does not
demand that the state or local action be value neutral or bereft of policy
concerns.164 Third, the court rejected the argument that the fleet rules
were not proprietary because they imposed criminal sanctions and fines
for noncompliance. 165 Finally, it rejected the argument that if other
governmental entities adopted similar rules it would disrupt the national
uniform market; no evidence had been proffered that showed such a
disruption, and in any event the court found no evidence that a
government's market power could exempt it from the MPE. 1
66
Several important themes emerge from this opinion. First, if
Congress wants to foreclose the scope of the MPE, courts should require
an express or implied statement to that effect. Second, notions of what
constitutes rational market behavior are changing, and cannot be
divorced from public policy goals. Third, the form of local action does
not determine whether it is proprietary or regulatory; that is, the
presence of sanctions or fines is not determinative. Finally, the
relationship between local action and the federal goal of uniformity
presents possible issues of fact that should not be assumed away. Each
of these themes appears in the MPE test for ceiling preemption further
developed in the next Part.
III. THE REGULATORY Is PROPRIETARY, THE PROPRIETARY IS
REGULATORY: LOCAL GOVERNMENTS As PARTICIPANTS IN THE MARKET
FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CITIZEN-CONSUMERS
A. Summary of Subnational Climate Change Initiatives
The void in climate policy left by the Bush Administration left state
and local governments scrambling to create and implement their own
climate change programs.' 67  The programs, taken together, have the
2006), rev'd, Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60 (2008)).
162. The Court also rejected a fifth argument that reaches beyond the scope of this Article. See
id. at 1047 (rejecting argument that exception does not apply because rules are directed at local
governments rather than state agencies).
163. Id. at 1046 (citing to FedEx and UPS fleet conversion programs).
164. Id. (citing to Alexandria Scrap, Boston Harbor, and other circuit court cases).
165. Id. at 1048.
166. Id.
167. Previous summaries of these efforts are available at Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global
Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 54 (2005); Eleanor
Stein, Regional Initiatives to Reduce Greeenhouse Gas Emissions, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND
U.S. LAW 315 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007); David Hodas, State Initiatives, in GLOBAL CLIMATE
20101
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potential to significantly, if not sufficiently, mitigate domestic GHG
emissions. According to one study, implementing all the state and local
programs in place as of September 2007 would effectively stabilize US
emissions at 2010 levels by 2020. 168
Most prominent has been the creation of the regional cap-and-trade
programs: the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), the Western
Climate Action Initiative (WCI), and the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas
Reduction Accord (Midwestern Accord).169  There has also been action
on a state-by-state level: 170  As of July 2009, twenty one states had set
targets for GHG emissions reductions. 17 1  Of these, seven--California,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, and
Washington-have enacted laws mandating specified reductions.
172
CHANGE AND U.S. LAW, supra at 353; Barry Rabe, Race to the Top: The Expanding Role of U.S. State
Renewable Portfolio Standards, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 10 (2007); Robert B. McKinstry, Jr.,
Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global Problems. State, Local and Private Leadership in
Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate Change, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L.
REV. 15, 15-16 (2004). Professor Farber provides a more detailed look at state initiatives in the
electricity and transportation sectors. See Farber, supra note 12, at 883-92. A detailed summary of
local actions can be found at J. Kevin Healy, Local Initiatives, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S.
LAW, supra, at 421.
168. Nicholas Lutsey & Daniel Sperling, America's Bottom-Up Climate Change Mitigation
Policy, 36 ENERGY POL'Y 673, 674 (2008). As the authors of the study freely admit, however,
stabilizing at 2010 levels falls short of what is needed. Id. at 683; see also DeShazo & Freeman, supra
note 10, at 1538 ("Existing state-level measures are currently minimal and uncertain, but even if they
were more developed, their potential effectiveness in the absence of a federal regime remains
speculative at best.").
169. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://rggi.org/; Western Climate Initiative,
http://www.westemclimateinitiative.org/; Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord,
http://www.midwestemaccord.org/index.html. For a discussion of how cap-and-trade programs offer
insufficient incentives for innovation, see David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Market
Liberalism's Shotgun Wedding: Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol, 83 IND. L. J. 21 (2008);
David M. Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Emissions
Trading, and Priority-Setting, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 501, 518-520 (2004); Holly Doremus & W.
Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act's Cooperative Federalism
Framework Is Useful for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIz. L. REV. 799 (2008) (arguing that
establishment of federal floors and mandates analogous to state implementation plans under the Clean
Air Act more likely to drive innovation); Margaret R. Taylor et al., Regulation as the Mother of
Invention: The Case of S02 Control, 27 L. & POL'Y 348, 370 (2005) (concluding that trading under the
acid rain trading program encouraged less innovation than earlier command-and-control regime).
170. Both EPA and the Pew Center for Global Climate Change maintain highly informative and
up-to-date websites that organize and track state level developments, from which the following summary
is derived. See generally EPA, State and Local Governments-State Actions,
http://yosemite.epa.gov/gw/statepolicyactions.nsf/webpages/index.html?openDocument; Pew Center for
Global Climate Change, U.S. States and Regions, http://www.pewclimate.org/states-regions.
171. See Pew Center for Global Climate Change, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Targets Map,
http://www.pewclimate.org/what -s..being-done/in the-states/emissionstargets.map.cfm.
172. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-38599 (West 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. 22a-200
(2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 342B-71 (2009); MINN. STAT. § 216H.02 (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2C-
38 (West 2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.235.020 (2009); see also Nat'l Conf. of State Legislatures,
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Separately, a number of states have implemented performance standards
for power plant CO2 emissions. 173 The majority of states have adopted,
or are in the process of adopting, state climate action plans. 174  The
majority of states have also established renewable or alternative energy
portfolio standards, or both, which require utilities to achieve a certain
percentage of contribution to power plant capacity or generation from
renewable or alternative energy sources.1
75
Locally, more than 965 mayors have signed on to the U.S. Conference
of Mayors Climate Action Protection Agreement, which sets a target of
7% reductions below 1990 levels by 2012.176 Whether to help achieve
that target or for other reasons, hundreds of cities and counties have
adopted local climate action plans, which, like their state counterparts,
serve as planning tools for policymakers. 177  The range of measures
recommended in these plans is diverse. Brookline, Massachusetts plans
to replace streetlights and traffic signals with LED and high-pressure
sodium technologies, convert town fleet vehicles to hybrid or biodiesel,
and encourage bicycling and car sharing in an overall effort to reduce
total vehicle-miles-traveled (VMTs).178 Many cities have passed similar
government fleet conversion laws and government green building
laws. 179 Places as different as Berkeley, California and Albany, New
Enacted Climate Change Legislation Requiring Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reductions, available at
http://www.ncsl.org/?Tabld= 13240.
173. See Edward S. Rubin, A Performance Standards Approach to Reducing C02 Emissions from
Electric Power Plants 9 (Pew Center for Climate Change, Coal Initiatives Reports: White Paper Series,
2009), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Coal-lnitiative-Series-Rubin.pdf.
174. See EPA, supra note 170; Pew Center for Global Climate Change, Climate Action Plans,
available at http://www.pewclimate.org/what s being-done/in the-states/action-plan-map.cfm.
175. See Pew Center for Global Climate Change, Renewable & Alternative Energy Portfolio
Standards, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/what-s.being-done/in thestates/rps.cfm; U.S.
Dep't of Energy, States with Renewable Portfolio Standards, available at
http://apps I .eere.energy.gov/states/maps/renewableportfolio states.cfm.
176. See Mayors Climate Prot. Ctr., Map of Participating Mayors,
http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/map.asp.
177. For a sample of local action plans, see EPA, State Action Plans Database - State and Local
Governments, http://yosemite.epa.gov/gw/StatePolicyActions.nsf/matrices/local.
178. See EPA, Local Action Plan Recommendations: Brookline, Massachusetts,
http://yosemite.epa.gov/gw/StatePolicyActions.nsf/LookupLocalExhibits/Massachusetts+:+Brookline.
For a robust account of the need and means to address VMTs, see Alice Kaswan, Climate Change,
Consumption, and Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 253, 254 (2009).
179. See, e.g., U.S. Green Bldg. Council, LEED Initiatives in Governments and Schools (2008),
available at https://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentlD=691 (noting that as of June 1, 2009,
198 localities had enacted green building laws) These measures are consistent with the approach
advocated by the Mayors Climate Agreement, which advocates "[a]dopt[ing] and [e]nforc[ing] land-use
policies that reduce sprawl, preserve open space, and create compact, walkable urban communities" and
"[p]romot[ing] transportation options such as bicycle trails, commute trip reduction programs, incentives
for car pooling and public transit," as well as improving building efficiency. U.S. CONFERENCE OF
MAYORS, THE U.S. MAYORS CLIMATE PROTECTION AGREEMENT,
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York, have even adopted local food purchasing policies that aim to
decrease energy use and GHG emissions. 80
Other local governments have gone further, and are regulating the
private sector. For instance, a handful of cities and smaller
municipalities have passed laws mandating green building
requirements 18  for new residential and commercial construction.
182
New York City has twice tried to hybridize its famous fleet of yellow
cabs, and Boston has done the same for its somewhat less uniform taxi
fleets. 183  And both San Francisco and Boulder, Colorado have
established a carbon tax, with San Francisco's targeting businesses that
generate CO2 emissions and Boulder's targeting residences. 1
84
For the limited purposes of this Article, whether local actions are the
"best" or "most effective" means to reduce GHG emissions is
tangential. 185 This Article does not argue that there should or should not
http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/documents/mcpAgreement.pdf.
180. CITY OF BERKELEY, ENVIRONMENTALLY PREFERABLE PURCHASE POLICY (2004),
http://www.besafenet.com/ppc/docs/purchasing/PUBPP.pdf; ALBANY COUNTY LEGISLATURE,
RESOLUTION 496 (2009), http://www.albanycounty.com/departments/legislature/
resolutions/2008/20081208/08-496.pdf.
181. "Green building" has been variously defined. See Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution
Revived: Sustainable Design, Land Use Regulation, and the States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231, 241-42
(2008); Jamison E. Colburn, Solidarity and Subsidiarity in a Changing Climate: Green Building as
Legal and Moral Obligations, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 232, 241-47 (2008). For an extensive treatment of
green building laws across the country, see Edna Sussman, Reshaping Municipal and County Laws to
Foster Green Building, Energy Efficiency, and Renewable Energy, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 8-19
(2008). For an examination of laws in New York State, see Patricia E. Salkin, New York Climate
Change Report Card: Improvement Needed for More Effective Leadership and Overall Coordination
with Local Government, 80 U. COL. L. REV. 921 (2009).
182. See, e.g., Bronin, supra note 181, at 255-60; SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., BUILDING CODE ch.
13C (2008); BABYLON, N.Y., LOCAL LAW NO. 40 § 89-86(a) (2006).
183. See infra notes 263, 266-285 and accompanying text.
184. See Samantha Young, California Weighs First Statewide Carbon Tax on Polluting
Industries, THE HUFFINGTON POST, June 25, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/25/
california-weighs-nations-n_220798.html (discussing delays to California's statewide carbon tax and
noting existence of local taxes).
185. This debate has been taking place elsewhere. See, e.g., Victor B. Flatt, Act Locally, Affect
Globally: How Changing Social Norms to Influence the Private Sector Shows a Path to Using Local
Government to Control Environmental Harms, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 455 (2008) (arguing that
local governments can affect large-scale environmental harms by influencing private sector through
targeted social norm creation); cf Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of
Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961 (2007) ("[L]ocal action is not well suited to regulating
mobile global conduct yielding a global externality."); Cary Coglianese & Jocelyn D'Ambrosio,
Policymaking Under Pressure: The Perils of Incremental Responses to Climate Change, 40 CONN. L.
REV. 1411 (2008) (arguing that incremental steps may prove worse than no action at all); JOHN BAILEY,
INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE, LESSONS FROM THE PIONEERS: TACKLING GLOBAL WARMING
AT THE LOCAL LEVEL (2007) (surveying climate change activities in ten cities and concluding that
despite commitment to reductions and elaboration of significant programs, cities were unlikely to reduce
GHG emissions below 1990 levels unless complementary state and federal policies are put in place).
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be a new international agreement on climate change, or a federal climate
change law.' 86 The question here is whether courts should prohibit local
governments from going further than purportedly uniform standards set
forth in existing environmental laws or a new federal climate change
law. 187
The market participant cases consistently frame the MPE as a matter
of local autonomy or right, which courts then struggle to conform to
existing categories of purpose (private or public) and form (participation
or regulation). The following subparts deconstruct these categories by
highlighting the descriptive reality of the interlocal competition familiar
to environmental law scholarship; the emergence of what, culling from
urban studies literature, might be called "place competition"; the
economic concerns behind local action; and the regulatory effect large
business corporations can and do have on the national economy. Once
the interpenetration of the proprietary and governmental is apparent, this
Article proposes an extension of the MPE that carries forward the
justifications behind the existing framework, respects the right to race to
the top, and offers a new means of balancing the values of federalization
and devolution.
B. The Regulatory Is Proprietary: Toward a Concept of Place
Competition
1. The Theory of Interlocal Competition
The concept of interlocal competition most familiar to environmental
law scholarship is rooted in an argument advanced by political
economist Charlies Tiebout in A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.'
88
Tiebout proposed that a decentralized system with many local
governments will act as a market for mobile residents, who will sort
186. For developed suggestions on how to structure an international or national regime in ways
that preserve local autonomy, see Richard B., Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate
Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REv. 681 (2008); Alice Kaswan, A
Cooperative Federalism Proposal for Climate Change Legislation: The Value of State Autonomy in a
Federal System, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 791 (2008); Michael Burger, Empowering Local Autonomy and
Encouraging Experimentation in Climate Change Governance: The Case for a Layered Regime, 39
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11161 (2009).
187. Of course, states may also stop localities from promulgating regulations more stringent than
federal floors. See Jerome M. Organ, Limitations on State Agency Authority to Adopt Environmental
Standards More Stringent than Federal Standards: Policy Considerations and Interpretive Problems, 54
MD. L. REv. 1373 (1995); Andrew Hecht, Note, Obstacles to the Devolution of Environmental
Protection: States' Self-Imposed Limitations on Rulemaking, 15 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 105
(2004).
188. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
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themselves into jurisdictions offering the mix of taxes and public goods
that they prefer.1 89  Tiebout's central thesis is that competition will
result in an optimal, or efficient, provision of public goods. 190 Though
this predicted efficiency and its desirability has inspired healthy
criticism, 19! it has long been widely accepted that cities do, in fact,
compete for residents, businesses, and capital, offering businesses
incentives ranging from tax abatements to bond financing to land deals
to "loosening of regulatory restrictions,"' 92 and offering residents "a
wide variety of public service and tax packages."' 93 In this way, mobile
citizens become consumers of localities, and localities become goods
actively and intentionally marketed to mobile citizens.' 
94
While Tiebout argued for the efficiency of competition, the
federalization of environmental law, as discussed above, was in no small
part a direct response to the "race to the bottom," and there are those
who believe that unregulated competition for businesses and industry
leads inexorably to the bottom.' 95 When properly constrained, however,
189. Id. at 418.
190. Id. at 420-21.
191. See, e.g., Vicki Been, 'Exit' as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 515-17 (1991) (summarizing criticisms
of Tiebout's "unrealistic assumptions" about consumer voters and communities, and his prediction of
equilibrium resulting from competition).
192. Id. at 513.
193. Id. at 520.
194. Professor Richard Schragger's recent scholarship identifies further layers of complexity in
this area. On the one hand, Schragger acknowledges that "[t]he dominant economic accounts of cities
presume that cities are open economies, governed not so much by law as by the force of mobile capital,
which dictates what cities can and cannot do as a matter of policy." Schragger, supra note 15, at 1096;
see also Erie J. Heikkila, Are municipalities Tieboutian clubs?, 26 REGIONAL SC. & URB. ECON. 203,
204 (1996) (analysis of Los Angeles County community sorting demonstrates "strong evidence" to
support existence of Tieboutian clubs). Yet, Schragger challenges this conventional view, and posits a
more extensive role for cities in national and international economic regulation, explaining that cities
exist not merely to attract mobile capital but because of the presence of place-bound residents and firms;
in Schragger's account, localities not only offer giveaways and make concessions to lure businesses but
also exploit them once they are more or less committed to a place by, for instance, placing conditions on
development projects through community benefit agreements and redistributing wealth through
minimum and living wage laws. Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation,
and the Democratic City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 482 (2009) [hereinafter Schragger, Mobile Capital].
195. Urban theorists have been keen to point out the adverse consequences of interlocal
competition occurring on a global scale. See, e.g., Michael Douglass, Intercity Competition and the
Question of Economic Resilience: Globalization and Crisis in Asia, in GLOBAL CITY-REGIONS: TRENDS,
THEORY, POLICY 237 (Allen J. Scott ed., 2001) (identifying competition for "world-city status" as
driving force behind destructive megaprojects and appeals for foreign direct investment in Pacific Asian
cities); Peter Hall, Towards a General Urban Theory, in CITIES IN COMPETITION: PRODUCTIVE AND
SUSTAINABLE CITIES FOR THE 21 ' CENTURY (John Brotchi et al. eds., 1995) (discussing hierarchy of
global, subglobal, national and regional cities); see also Harvey Molotch, The City as Growth Machine:
Toward a Political Economy of Place, 82 AM. J. Soc. 309 (1976) (noting that localities compete to
establish the "preconditions" of growth that ultimately benefits land-based elite).
2010] IT'S NOT EASY BEING GREEN 869
competition can undoubtedly produce beneficial results, from normative,
consequentialist, and expressivist perspectives. The key constraint
appears to be a federal floor. For example, Christopher Serkin recently
proposed that the benefits of Tieboutian-style interlocal competition can
be harnessed by reformulating local property law that allows
governments to precommit to varying levels of protections for and
against different types of takings, exaction fees, vested rights,
development agreements, variances, and master plan consistency
determinations; under Serkin's proposal, these arrangements would be
limited by Fifth Amendment protections. 1
96
Even beyond efficiency, interlocal competition may also produce a
"race to the top,'' 197 in which cities strive to outdo one another in
environmental performance to attract, for instance, service-sector
industry and highly desirable residents (meaning those who give a lot to
the tax base without using a lot of services). 198 The emergence of this
"urban entrepreneurialism" has been well documented. 199 Traditional
quality of life concerns have always included things such as clean air
and access to parks, 200 but twenty-first century citizen-consumers have
become consumers of the laws and regulations that define a place, as
well as the business incentives and bundles of taxes and services that
they offer. Local climate change and sustainability initiatives are at the
196. See Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of Property Protection, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 883, 890 ("[Florced uniformity... inappropriately ties local governments' hands....
[Greater diversity of property law choices] will give local governments another bargaining chip in the
competition for desirable local uses, and will give developers, investors, and even individual
homeowners the ability to select from a variety of competing property regimes.").
197. See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY 6,259 (1995) (equating race to the top with a "California effect" that pushes political
jurisdictions toward stricter environmental regulation).
198. It bears noting, here, that interlocal competition for desirable residents raises the distinct
possibility of excluding "undesirable" ones through land use decisions and other means. See Schragger,
supra note 15, at 1148-49 ("The competition for ratables and wealthy people will leave those persons or
firms that are undesirable from a tax and spending perspective out in the cold."); see also Richard C.
Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1854-55 (2003) (proposing state or
regional solution).
199. A full accounting of the sociology, urban studies, and political science and economy
literatures engaging with urban entrepreneurialism is beyond the scope of this paper. One starting point
would be THE ENTREPRENEURIAL CITY: GEOGRAPHIES OF POLITICS, REGIME, AND REPRESENTATION,
(Tim Hall & Phil Hubbard eds., 1998). A literature looking specifically at "green" urban
entrepeneurialism has also begun to emerge. See Aidan While et al., The Environment and the
Entrepreneurial City: Searching for the Urban 'Sustainability Fix' in Manchester and Leeds, 28 INT'L J.
URB. & REGIONAL RES. 549; Corina McKendry, Competing for Green: Neoliberalism, Environmental
Justice, and the Limits of Ecological Modernization,(49t' Annual Conf. of the Int'l Studies Ass'n, 2008),
available at http://www.allacademic.conlmeta/p_mlaaparesearch_citation/2/5/4/0/9/
p254091_index.html.
200. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) ("Aesthetic and environmental well-being,
like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society ... ").
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center of this emerging trend.2° 1
2. Places As Green Brands
The notion of "place" is often invoked in American letters, usually to
communicate a deeply valued personal association between an
individual, or community, and a specific geographical location.2 °2 Yet,
place is also of consequence to both the purposes and structures of
environmental law.203 Although the values of place are perhaps more
intuitively and thus more frequently associated with rural regions,20 4
wilderness areas, public lands of the American West,20 5 or sites sacred
to Native Americans,20 6 they are undoubtedly relevant to built and urban
environments as well.20 7 Indeed, the urban planning community has
201. See MATTHEW E. KAHN, GREEN CITIES, URBAN GROWTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2006);
KENT E. PORTNEY, TAKING SUSTAINABLE CITIES SERIOUSLY: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE
ENVIRONMENT, AND QUALITY OF LIFE IN AMERICAN CITIES (2003).
202. See, e.g., TERRY TEMPEST WILLIAMS, REFUGE: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY OF FAMILY AND
PLACE (1992) (a landscape in Utah); GRETEL EHRLICH, THE SOLACE OF OPEN SPACES 2 (1985) (the
"planet of Wyoming"); NORMAN MACLEAN, A RIVER RUNS THROUGH IT (1976) (fly fishing in
Montana); ANNIE DILLARD, A PILGRIM AT TINKER CREEK (1974) (the Blue Ridge Mountains of
Virginia); EDWARD ABBEY, DESERT SOLITAIRE: A SEASON IN THE WILDERNESS (1968) (the red rock
desert in Utah); ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (1949) (Sauk County, Wisconsin).
203. See, e.g., CHRISTINE A. KLEIN ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: A PLACE-BASED BOOK
OF PROBLEMS AND CASES 24-34 (2005); Mark Sagoff, Settling America or the Concept of Place in
Environmental Ethics, 12 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 349, 389 (1992) (place "combines
the meaning we associate with nature and the utility we associate with the environment. It fosters
respect for our surroundings that arises from harmony, partnership, and intimacy."); Charles Wilkinson,
Land Use, Science, and Spirituality. The Search for a True and Lasting Relationship with the Land, 21
PUB. LAND. & RESOURCES L. REV. 1, 2 (2000); Robert R.M. Verchick, Critical Space Theory: Keeping
Local Geography in American and European Environmental Law, 73 TUL. L. REV. 739 (1999)
(describing significance of geography to transborder waste transportation and decisions on judicial
standing). But see Nancy Perkins Spyke, The Land Use-Environmental Law Distinction: A Geo-
Feminist Critique, 13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 55, 90-91 (2002) (arguing that much of
environmental law ignores the significance of place).
204. See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, Ethics, Community, and Private Land, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 631,
652-55 (1996); see also WENDELL BERRY, THE UNSETTLING OF AMERICA: CULTURE & AGRICULTURE
(1977).
205. See, e.g., Sandra B. Zellmer, Sustaining Geographies of Hope: Cultural Resources on Public
Lands, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 413 (2002) (discussing importance of place to individuals and communities
in context of public lands management in the American West).
206. See LLOYD BURTON, WORSHIP AND WILDERNESS: CULTURE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE
MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC LANDS AND RESOURCES (2002); Barry Goode, A Legislative Approach to the
Protection of Sacred Sites, 10 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 169 (2004); Dune Lankard,
Sacred Places: Indian Rights After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 10 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 371 (1999).
207. See, e.g., John Nivala, Saving the Spirit of Our Places: A View on Our Built Environment, 15
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (1996-97) (noting the peculiar environmental interests of buildings and
structures); Sagoff, supra note 203; see also Nancy Perkins Spyke, Charm in the City: Thoughts on
Urban Ecosystem Management, 16 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 153 (2001) (arguing for a place-based
approach to urban ecosystem management); Sheila R. Foster, From Harlem to Havana: Sustainable
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been talking about how to create and preserve a sense of place for
almost half-a-century.
20 8
Today, the notion of place expands beyond the boundaries of physical
space to a broader set of ideas and relationships. 20 9  As individuals and
communities, we do not identify only with the natural and built
environments we inhabit; we also identify with the regulatory
environments that circumscribe those spaces and, on an individual and
collective level, govern our interactions with other individuals and
communities, as well as the natural and built environments themselves.
In the globalized world, the boundaries of sovereignty are porous on
every level: international laws and institutions penetrate national and
210subnational jurisdictions, going so far as to regulate rights to genetic
information,211 while individuals participate directly in international
relations through their political and consumptive choices.212 To the
extent that it is a choice, where to live is one way individuals enter this
global exchange.213 Under these conditions, local governments' ability
to brand themselves "green" and advertise themselves to
citizen-consumers becomes increasingly important, and more deserving
of legal recognition.214
Urban Development, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 783, 801 (2003) (commitments to urban sustainable
development "must be rooted in particular societies, communities, cultures, and 'places' which then
must perpetuate them and project them into the future"); Gary C. Bryner, Policy Devolution and
Environmental Law: Exploring the Transition to Sustainable Development, 26 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y J. 1, 19-20 (2002) (local partnerships can ensure that place is taken into account in sustainable
development planning); Wendy Lee Anderson et al., Lost Landscapes and Failed Economies: The
Search for a Value of Place by Thomas Michael Power, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 377 (1997) (examining the
economic impact and value of the environment as place).
208. See KEvIN LYNCH, THE IMAGE OF THE CITY (1960); JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF
GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961); MIKE GREENBERG, THE POETICS OF CITIES: DESIGNING
NEIGHBORHOODS THAT WORK (1995); RICHARD SENNETT, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE EYE: THE DESIGN
AND SOCIAL LIFE OF CITIES (1990).
209. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky and Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks?: Local Climate
Change Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. INT'L. L. 409 (2008).
210. See Allen J. Scott et al., Global City-Regions, in GLOBAL CITY-REGIONS, supra note 195, at
13 (new social and political organization of globalization "consists above all of a hierarchy of
interpenetrating territorial scales of economic activity and governance relations, ranging from the global
to the local").
211. See generally KEITH AOKI, SEED WARS; CONTROVERSIES AND CASES ON PLANT GENETIC
RESOURCES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2008).
212. See, e.g., Dhavan V. Shah et al., The Politics of Consumption/The Consumption of Politics,
611 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 6 (2007).
213. See Osofsky & Levit, supra note 209 (describing "bottom-up networking" approach to
transnational movement for climate change mitigation and adaptation).
214. See Peter Van Ham, Place Branding: The State of the Art, 616 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 126, 127 (2008) (defining place brand as "the totality of the thoughts, feelings, associations
and expectations that come to mind when a prospect or consumer is exposed to an entity's name, logo,
products, services, events, or any design or symbol representing them" and, more generally, examining
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Within this context, the growth of local climate change and
sustainability initiatives takes on at least two important roles. First, the
initiatives operate on the level of signification. Local governments can
now be seen to represent their residents on multiple levels, both literally
and symbolically. 215 On a literal level, they represent their residents not
only in local regulation and policymaking but also in lobbying and
organizing, either directly or within an association, at the state, national,
and international levels. 216  For instance, a member city of the U.S.
Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement is committed to,
among other things, urging the state and federal government to reduce
GHG emissions to the levels in the Kyoto Protocol and to pass federal
legislation on climate change.217 Similarly, a member city of ICLEI-
Local Governments for Sustainability (formerly the International
Council of Local Environmental Initiatives) is part of an international
coalition of local governments and associations dedicated to information
sharing, capacity building, and campaigning for sustainable
development.218 On a symbolic level, the local initiatives, as well as the
government's participation in these networks, represent the residents'
individual and collective identity.219  There is an emotional
attachment-reflected in the scholarship and law of localism-to the
value and power of local decisionmaking in certain areas, such as land
use and education; 220 this stems from individuals' connecting local
autonomy to "core areas of personal autonomy."22' Consumptive
decisions with even the faintest impact on climate change and
sustainability-at least for some people who are drawn to certain
places-constitutes just such a "core area." Indeed, the moral (or
perhaps moralistic) aspect to climate action is an essential explanation
relevance of place branding as a political phenomenon in international politics); Margaret Scammell,
Political Brands and Consumer Citizens: The Rebranding of Tony Blair, 611 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. Sci. 176 (2007) (arguing that increasing importance of political "brands" indicates move toward
consumer model of political communication).
215. Eco-feminist literature has much to offer in expanding on this phenomenon. See VAL
PLUMWOOD, FEMINISM AND THE MASTERY OF NATURE 21, 186 (1993) ("[Ecological selfhood] ... must
be seen rather as an attempt to obtain a new human and a new social identity in relation to nature which
challenges this dominant instrumental conception, and its associated social relations").
216. See, e.g., Osofsky & Levit, supra note 209.
217. U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 179.
218. See ICLEI, Local Governments for Sustainability, http://iclei.org/.
219. Though they have apparently fallen out of vogue, expressivist theories of law-conceptions
of law as an expression of collective attitudes and beliefs-provide the theoretical underpinnings of this
view of local climate change initiatives. See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes,
Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503 (2000).
220. Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1789 (2002).
221. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part l-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
346, 452 (1990).
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for its local traction.
The second role the initiatives play grows directly out of the first.
These literal and symbolic significations, projected onto multiscalar
screens, imbue the place with a brand, and that brand becomes a product
in the market for places to live and work, potentially spurring economic
development. Rosemary Coombe, writing in a separate context,
provides an excellent synopsis:
Geographers continually remind us that places "should not be regarded as
enclosed spatial territories which have stable essential identities" but
rather should be "seen as dynamic and open entities whose meanings and
identities are constituted within a cross-cutting network of often global
social relations and understanding." What these examples suggest,
however, is that there are strong global pressures at work to project a
place as having a stable and essential identity in a networked world of
informational goods. Indeed, the growing field of expertise known as
"place branding" is based on the premise that places require brands that
are "authentic... being based on what a place is good at or what it does
best." In an increasingly globally connected world, "every place must
compete with every other place for its share of the world's wealth, talent,
and attention" and, thus, must distinguish itself based upon its physical,
human, heritage, and cultural capital. The brand for a place is being
touted as "a key component of its overall economic development
strategy."
' 223
Thus, a "sticky" green brand can prove an important asset for a
locality. The slate of local climate initiatives bears this out. As has been
observed by others in more detail, climate change poses a classic
collective action problem. 224 No state, nor any collection of states-far
less a city or county-has an economic incentive, classically conceived,
to deter GHG emissions; acting alone, they cannot hope to meaningfully
address the problem, and whatever environmental benefit does result
from the effort will be shared with the world rather than enjoyed by the
222. See, e.g., Andreen, supra note 9, at 280-81; Sherman J. Clarke, Ethical Implications: Law as
Communitarian Virtue Ethics, 53 BUFFALO L. REV. 757, 758 (2005) ("[L]aw ... can serve as a valuable
and perhaps irreplaceable arena for the construction and articulation of community identity.").
223. Rosemary J. Coombe et al., Bearing Cultural Distinction: Informational Capitalism and New
Expectations for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 891, 902 (2007) (footnotes omitted); see
also David Gertner, Editorial, Place Branding: Dilemma or Reconciliation Between Political Ideology
and Economic Pragmatism?, 3 PLACE BRANDING AND PUB. DiPL. 3, 4 (2007) ("Positive brand images
have helped many economies boost their exports, and attract investments, businesses, factories, visitors,
residents and talented people."); Omari Scott Simmons, Branding the Small Wonder: Delaware's
Dominance and the Market for Corporate Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 129 (2008) (analyzing strength of
Delaware brand in interstate market for corporate charters).
224. See, e.g., Glicksman & Levy, supra note 7; Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal
Regulation of the Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183 (arguing for
half-glass-full view of state and local initiatives that reflect global collective action failure).
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actor. Moreover, the costs of climate action-whether it be mitigation
or adaptation-will undoubtedly be high.225  But local governments
have moved forward anyway. There are a number of theoretical and
pragmatic explanations for why. 226  Undoubtedly, there is a strong
demand among voters for action, 227 which can be attributed both to
signification values (such as the value of symbolic statements, the
"warm glow" of altruistic behavior, the desire to influence other
jurisdictions to take action) and economic ones (such as a misperception
by voters of the possible costs and benefits of action, or the desire to
create new jobs).228 It also may make people "happy. 229 In addition,
politicians and government officials may have their own reasons,
including administrative and political entrepreneurship (i.e., professional
or political aspiration, or possibly even a commitment to the public
interest); anticipation of a future market for GHG emissions credits; or
attracting new "green energy" businesses.23 ° Indeed, these politicians,
and the interests they represent, may be angling to create agglomeration
economies around climate change mitigation.23'
225. The costs are, perhaps, more favorably termed "unknown." For example, California's Global
Warming Solutions Act projects potential economic gains for the state, including 83,000 jobs and
approximately $4 billion in gross income. CAL. CLIMATE ACTION TEAM, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
CLIMATE ACTION TEAM REPORT TO GOVERNOR SCHWARZENEGGER AND THE LEGISLATURE 65 (2006),
available at http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/climate-action_team/reports/2006report/2006-04-
03_FINAL CAT_REPORT.PDF. But the Act imposes no limit on costs, requiring instead that the
regulations achieve "the maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective" reductions. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38560 (West 2009). The Act defines "cost-effective" as the cost of reduced
GHG emissions "adjusted for its global warming potential." Id. § 38505(d).
226. See generally Glicksman, supra note 4, at 779-80 (arguing that "cooperative federalism
programs" have allowed the states to close the "institutional competence" gap with federal regulators;
that "inflexibility on the part of federal regulators provided further opportunities for the states"; that
local politicians are motivated by "ideological commitments" and responsiveness to "constituents'
demands for greater environmental protection"; that local needs driving state initiatives are of little
concern to federal officials; and that state and local entities might adopt environmental standards to
forestall "the imposition of more rigorous federal controls.").
227. William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108,
115-16 (2005) (arguing that decreased federal environmental action provides an opportunity for states to
respond to the preferences of the median voter at the "relevant level of government"); DeShazo &
Freeman, supra note 10, at 1519 (finding appeal to electorate "most plausible" among alternative
explanations).
228. See Kirsten H. Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-Motives and State and Local Climate
Change Initiatives, 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 119, 127-33 (2008).
229. Clarke, supra note 222, at 771 (arguing that a "central aim of law and politics ought to be the
happiness of the people governed thereby").
230. Engel & Orbach, supra note 228, at 133-135; see also Barry G. Rabe et al., State
Competition as a Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3-4 (2005)
(claiming that much subnational regulation amounts to state positioning in anticipation of federal or
international regulation, and arguing that state regulation can be explained in terms of an
interjurisdictional competition among states for economic development).
231. See, e.g., Scott et al., supra note 210, at 14-18 (discussing benefits of agglomeration
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On the other side of the economic incentive coin is the cost of
adaptation to climate change. Cities stand to absorb tremendous costs,
including retrofitting or reconstructing critical infrastructure, indirect
effects related to water supply and agriculture, and public health
effects. 32 As corporate entities with a proprietary interest in sewers,
sidewalks, land, and hospitals, it seems within their purview to take
mitigating measures against those future costs. 233 Leakage of emissions
to other jurisdictions-including foreign jurisdictions competing for a
different set of industries and residents-may negate any achievements;
while this counsels for cooperation on broader scales, it does not dilute
the rights of localities to do what they think is in their best interest.
A reasonable question at this point is whether any of this adds up to
real competition? Do citizen-consumers actually stay where they are or
move based on local climate change and sustainability policies? Though
I am unaware of any empirical data that specifically proves the point, I
would suggest that the answer is yes. First, studies have shown that the
value of local laws that create public goods are, at least in some
instances, capitalized into local housing prices and wages. 234  Second,
economies in regard to developing city-regions, including concentration of knowledge, materials and
networks). Of course, the relationship between green branding and economic development might
conceivably cut two ways in clearing climate change initiatives under the market participant exception.
In Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court ruled that economic development is a "public
purpose" under the Takings Clause. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). The Court specifically noted that
"[p]romoting economic development is a traditional and long-accepted function of government." Id. at
485. Thus, under the test in Section 1II.B of Davis, a city might be performing the "dual role."
Alternatively, the traditional function test might exempt a locality altogether under the majority decision
in Davis and United Haulers.
232. See, e.g., NEW YORK CITY PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE RISK INFORMATION,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc203/downloads/pdf/nyc_climate-changereport.pdf; see also
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 342 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that plaintiff coastal
states and city allege "that a rise in sea level induced by global warming will cause more frequent and
severe flooding, harm coastal infrastructure including airports, subway stations, tunnels, tunnel vent
shafts, storm sewers, wastewater treatment plants, and bridges, and cause hundreds of billions of dollars
of damage").
233. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 340-49 (discussing standing of New York City and State
plaintiffs to allege public nuisance for global warming based on proprietary interests).
234. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS (2001) (arguing that because local
government policies, including those that create public goods, are capitalized into housing prices, and
because homeowners vote to preserve and improve the value of their homes, local governments tend to
enact policies that maximize local welfare); Anup Malani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities, 121 HARV.
L. REV. 1273 (2008) (using hedonic model to show how compulsory or no-fault automobile insurance
laws, laws concerning exceptions to employment-at-will, health insurance mandates and tort reforms are
capitalized into housing values and wages); see also Jamison E. Colburn, Localism's Ecology:
Protecting and Restoring Habitat in the Suburban Nation, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 945, 993 (2006)
(suggesting possibility, under appropriate circumstances, that "the market value of a genuine connection
to (and respect for) nature [may] be incorporated into home values"). Of course, as Professor Colbum
also pointed out to me, the salience of such factors may have been exposed by the implosion of the
derivatives-driven real estate bubble of the first decade of the twenty-first century.
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there is anecdotal evidence that "special interest" communities, like the
environmental community, relocate due to the state of the law.235 Third,
the growing popularity of Environmental Indices and Greenest Places to
Live lists evidence the citizen-consumer demand for information about
cities' environmental and climate change performance.236  The
somewhat amorphous notion of "quality of life" has often been lumped
among the bundle of public services or local amenities offered by cities,
such as parks and recreation, schools, libraries, housing and welfare, and
generally includes local environmental quality as one of its elements.
But new lists go beyond air and water quality to include things like per
capita GHG emissions and overall carbon footprint.
237
The above discussion demonstrates that proprietary and regulatory
purposes converge for local governments engaged in local climate
change initiatives. This stands in direct contrast to the classic
proprietary-governmental distinction, which relied on a monolithic
assumption that "business purposes" equate perfectly with profit, and
that governmental purposes equate with public policy. The case law,
dating back to Alexandria Scrap and through the Ninth Circuit's remand
decision in SCAQMD, makes clear that the MPE recognizes that when
governments act as proprietors in a market, they do so as governments
as well. The realities of place competition and the race to the top favor a
recognition that governments acting as governments are also acting as
proprietors within a market.
C. The Proprietary Is Regulatory: Sovereign Corporations and the
Public Purpose Proprietor
Just as governments act like proprietors, in the contemporary world
businesses sometimes act like regulators. Indeed, one effect of our
unified national market is the extraordinary power wielded by the largest
235. See Malani, supra note 234, at 1283-84 (relating stories of gay and lesbian couples
responding directly to laws respecting (or not) their marriage or partnership status, as well as their
relationships to adopted children, and of doctors leaving states that do not enact tort reform).
236. See, e.g., Elizabeth Svoboda, America's 50 Greenest Cities, POPULAR SC1.,Feb. 08, 2008,
available at, http://www.popsci.com/environment/article/2008-02/americas-50-greenest-cities?page= ;
Nat. Res. Def. Council, CityGrid: Large Cities I Smarter Cities,
http://smartercities.nrdc.org/rankings/large; SustainLane, 2008 US City Rankings,
http://www.sustainlane.com/us-city-rankings/.
237. See International Living, Quality of Life Index 2009,
http://www.intemationalliving.com/nternal-Components/Further-Resources/qofl2OO9; cf Vicki Been,
"Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 473, 521 (1991) ("Consumer information about the 'best places to live' routinely
includes information about a city's taxes, how much a city spends for education, and other indices of
public service quality.").
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business corporations. It is increasingly common for corporations to
brand themselves green by acting through their market influence in ways
that benefit the public weal as well as their bottom lines.
In 2005, for instance, Wal-Mart adopted an environmental initiative,
"Sustainability 360." Sustainability 360 sets out three goals: to be
supplied 100% by renewable energy, to create zero waste, and to sell
products that "sustain our resources and the environment." 238 These
goals represent internal, corporate governance programs similar to a
government's decision to purchase hybrid buses or retrofit public
buildings with compact fluorescent light bulbs. To the extent that courts
look to the "typical behavior of private parties" to categorize a
government action as market regulation or market participation, these
efforts demonstrate that public policy considerations factor in.239
But Wal-Mart has gone further, imposing standards that effectively
regulate their suppliers. For instance, in response to a series of massive
recalls, Wal-Mart, together with Toys-R-Us, announced in February
2008 that toys shipped to their chains would have to meet safety
standards for lead, phthalates, and other toxins that exceeded federal
standards. 240  More recently, Wal-Mart announced that it was creating
an environmental and social sustainability labeling system for all
products on its shelves. 24' The program is similar to the "Eco Options"
labeling program initiated by Home Depot in 2007,242 though on a far
greater scale. Douglas Kysar demonstrates the importance of these
green labeling standards in a recent article, which discusses the gap
between the growing citizen-consumer demand for transparency
regarding the processes by which products are made, and the
government's traditional concentration on regulating the risks posed by
238. WALMART, 2009 GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY REPORT EXECUTIVE REPORT 6 (2009),
http://walmartstores.com/download/3835.pdf.
239. See also FedEx, Cleaner Vehicles, http://about.fedex.designcdt.com/
corporatejresponsibility/theenvironment/altemativeenergy/cleanervehicles (last visited May 17,
2010); Press Release, UPS, UPS First in Industry to Purchase Hydraulic Hybrid Vehicles (Oct. 27,
2008), available at http://www.pressroom.ups.com/Press+Releases/Archive/2008/Q4/
UPS+First+in+lndustry+to+Purchase+Hydraulic+Hybrid+Vehicles.
240. See, e.g., Anne D'lnnocenzio, CPSC chair warns toy industry must self-regulate as new
standards, regulations are hashed out, AP FIN. WIRE, Feb. 19, 2008; David Funkhouser, At Capitol, A
Battle Over Toy Safety, Trying to Get Lead Reduced, Some Chemicals Banned, HARTFORD COURANT,
Apr. 9, 2008, at Al.
241. See Stephanie Rosenbloom, At Wal-Mart, Labels to Reflect Green Intent, N.Y. TIMES, July
15, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/16/business/energy-
environment/I 6walmart.html?_r-l. But see Carl Frankel, Green Labeling Facing Crisis of Faith,
MATTER NETWORK, Jan. 12, 2009, available at http://featured.mattemetwork.com/category/green-
marketing/.
242. Michael Barbaro, Home Depot to Display an Environmental Label, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
2007, at CI.
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the final products.243 When it comes to product labeling, then, the
private sector is ahead of the federal government.
These efforts should be acknowledged. According to Forbes.com,
Wal-Mart is the eighth largest company in the world; 244 if it were its
own economy, it would be the world's thirtieth largest. 245  Wal-Mart's
toy safety standards and nascent labeling requirement will have
repercussions on a scale that outstrips the effect that similar standards
would have if imposed by many, if not all states. Yet, there is nothing to
stop Wal-Mart from regulating broad swaths of the product
manufacturing industry; in the end, the company may be seeking to
force federal regulation based on ethical principles, or to gain a
competitive advantage by appealing to consumers' desires, or both at the
same time. 246  The point is that local governments are not afforded this
same opportunity-but they ought to be.
D. The Proposed Test
The indeterminacy of the market participant-market regulator or the
proprietary-governmental distinction does not justify abandoning the
MPE altogether. For one thing, the interpretive space the doctrine allots
courts is not unique in the law. Moreover, the MPE represents an
important and prudential balancing of local and federal concerns. At the
same time, opening the MPE to all government actions that occur within
the context of place competition obviously goes too far. After all, any
243. Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525 (2004).
244. Forbes, The Global 2000, available at http://www.forbes.com/lists/2009/18/global-09_The-
Global-2000_Company.html.
245. Bruce Upbin, Wall-to-Wall Wal-Mart, FORBES, Apr. 12, 2004,
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2004/0412/076.html.
246. 1 do not mean to stake a claim in the debates surrounding the goods and evils of Wal-Mart.
The above discussion is not an endorsement of Wal-Mart's business practices-there is ample evidence
of the problems that company poses to local communities, local businesses and its own suppliers and
workers. See, e.g., M. Isabel Medina, Wal-Mart, Immigrant Workers and the U.S. Government-A Case
of Split Personality?, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1443 (2007); Molly Selvin & Abigail Goldman, Wal-Mart
Workers Win Suit, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005, at Al; Charles Fishman, The Wal-Mart You Don't Know,
FAST COMPANY, Dec. 19 2007, available at http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/77/walmart.html.
Nor does it represent an acceptance of Wal-Mart's claims of environmental improvement-there are
watchdog organizations who would contend that, though noble, Wal-Mart's efforts do not always fulfill
their promise. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Watch, http://walmartwatch.comlissues/environment/, As with any
green branding campaign, a conscious consumer must be wary of the risk of "greenwashing." See
Sourcewatch Encyclopedia, Greenwashing, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Greenwashing
(last visited May 17, 2010) (defining greenwashing as "the unjustified appropriation of environmental
virtue by a company, an industry, a government, a politician or even a non-govemment organization to
create a pro-environmental image, sell a product or a policy, or to try and rehabilitate their standing with
the public and decision makers after being embroiled in controversy").
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government decision can be framed as, in one way or another, seeking to
create a place brand by, for instance, improving the quality of life or
spurring economic development. For instance, local living wage laws
might be characterized as occurring within a "race to the top" in
employment policy, and as catering to a constituency that would prefer
to live in a place where wealth is redistributed from certain big
247businesses to their employees. I do not argue here that wage laws
cannot be considered market participation, 48 only that there must be
limits, or else the entirety of local governments' regulatory function
could be considered an element of interlocal competition. Accordingly,
this Article's proposed test strives to be consistent with the justifications
for the MPE, to balance the policy values of federalization and
devolution, and to remain appropriately cabined to avoid swallowing
preemption.
I propose that the MPE to environmental ceiling preemption apply to
local governments when they undertake an environmental initiative in an
area of traditional local concern; within the scope of a comprehensive
plan for sustainability or climate change action; and the initiative will
neither substantially interfere with the purposes of the imposed ceiling
nor substantially externalize costs.
Both the theoretical validity and instrumental utility of the test is seen
by reviewing the federalization and devolution arguments for and
against federal ceilings beside the MPE's justifications:
Federalization Devolution Values Justifications for
Values MPE
In Favor of Ceilings Against Ceilings
Efficiencies of Innovations of Effect: Uniform
Uniformity Diversity Market
Combating Local Preferences No Negative
NIMBYism Externalities
Local Conditions Evenhandedness
Race to the Top Federalism values
(local preferences,
innovation)
The columns reveal that the consistency with the MPE, balancing of
247. See Schragger, Mobile Capital, supra note 194, at 512-17 (discussing relationship between
wage laws and effort to redefine relationship between cites, capital and labor).
248. See RUI One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d 1137, 1145 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004) (dicta
stating that local law requiring marina to provide living wage not the act of a market participant).
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federalization and devolution values, and imposition of appropriate
limits on the test are all of a piece.
First, in granting cities the same latitude afforded private businesses
to appeal to citizen-consumers, the test matches the principle of
evenhandedness underlying the MPE. This principle also limits the
scope of the exception: Cities are no more able to escape federal
minimum standards than a private actor. Indeed, the competition that
gives causes the race to the bottom is exactly what federal
environmental law counteracted with federal floors. Therefore, it makes
no sense to allow any and all local regulation to qualify for the
exception; indeed, it is only in relation to a federal ceiling that the
exception can apply.
This point also underscores how the test acknowledges that the MPE
represents a pragmatist, rather than a constitutional, limit on
congressional authority. The pragmatist nature of the exception is
evident in the presumption against preemption of the exception
articulated in Boston Harbor and the Ninth Circuit's remand decision in
SCAQMD.249  This presumption gestures toward generic federalism
concerns but does not go so far as to bar Congress from regulating
market participant-like activities. Given the extraordinary reach of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause, as recognized in cases
from Wickard v. Fillburn25 °  to Gonzales v. Raich,25' such an
acknowledgment is necessary.
Second, in considering the effect of a local action on the uniform
national market and protecting against cost externalization, the test
caters to devolution values while balancing them against federalization
values. This structural balancing bears more than a passing resemblance
to the test set forth in Pike-as stated above, the absence of this
balancing from ceiling preemption analysis creates an unfortunately and
unnecessarily rigid framework; one goal of this Article's proposal is to
correct for this absence.
Finally, the test is further cabined by being limited to local
government actions in areas of traditional local concern. Thus, state tort
liability 25 2 and foreign relations 253 fall outside its ambit.
249. See supra Part II.C.2-3.
250. 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (Congress has power to regulate wheat produced solely for private
consumption).
251. 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (Congress has power to prohibit cultivation and private medical use of
marijuana legalized under state law).
252. To my knowledge, the MPE has never been applied to state common law. For a thorough
and illuminating discussion of the Supreme Court's erosion of state common law autonomy, see
Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 14; Klass, supra note 132. For a discussion of courts' approach to
state and federal common law climate change actions see Alexandra B. Klass, State Innovation and
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IV. APPLICATION
This Part applies the above test to three cases where courts have
found local laws preempted by existing environmental laws. First,
however, this Part summarizes ACESA's salient provisions, which
convey the scope of preemption to be expected in federal climate change
law.
254
The largest component of ACESA is its cap-and-trade program.255
The program would expressly preempt subnational cap-and-trade
regimes for the five years between 2012-2017, leaving preemption
beyond that point to be determined.256 Regarding energy supply, the bill
would also establish a national renewable portfolio standard that
preserves the right of states to surpass it,257 as well as performance
standards for coal-burning power plants, though it does not mention
whether existing state standards would be preempted.258 In terms of
energy efficiency, ACESA directs the Department of Energy to create a
national building code, again preserving the right of states to surpass
it.259 But in establishing new energy efficiency standards for a number
of appliances, the law preempts state building codes that require
appliance efficiency standards that surpass federal minimums.26 °
Similarly, in setting new emissions standards for vehicles, ACESA
essentially preserves the preemption status quo, including California's
special status under the Clean Air Act.261 Finally, the portion of the bill
that establishes a planning process for siting and building a "green"
transmission grid appears to encourage collaboration among all
government levels.262
Preemption: Lessons from State Climate Change Efforts, 41 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1653, 1693-99 (2008)
[hereinafter Klass, State Innovation].
253. Cf United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (state standards regulating oil tanker design,
equipment, reporting, and operating requirements preempted by Port and Waterways Safety Act due to
impact on international maritime commerce).
254. William Buzbee provides a useful overview of his own, finding overall that it is a "mixed
bag," and that a lack of clarity will undoubtedly lead to industry-led preemption challenges. See
William Buzbee, Waxman-Markey, CPRBIog, (Apr. 10, 2009), http://www.progressivereform.org/
CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog-903A8A9A- I EOB-E803-CA7DO 1AC90FO7ACO; see also Buzbee, supra note 5.
255. ACESA, supra note 5, § 334.
256. Id. § 335.
257. Id. § 101 (savings clause at amended § 6 10(i)).
258. Id. § 116.
259. Id. § 201 (savings clause at amended § 304(b)).
260. Id. §§ 211-13. The new law arguably makes it easier for states and localities to obtain a
waiver to set more stringent standards. Id. § 213(g).
261. Id. § 221, 221(4); see also John M. Broder, Obama to Toughen Rules on Emissions and
Mileage, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2009, at Al.
262. ACESA, supra note 5, § 151.
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The structure of ACESA, then, while doing much to establish a
national climate change response, reiterates many of the existing
preemption problems facing localities keen on crafting local responses
to the global problem. This subpart applies my revised market
participant test to three cases that have arisen under existing law, and
would likely remain problematic under ACESA. First, I address vehicle
fleet rules, revisiting recent court decisions preempting New York City's
attempt to hybridize its fleet of yellow cabs.263 Second, I address green
building codes, revisiting a recent court decision preempting
Albuquerque's requirement that new buildings meet energy efficiency
requirements that surpass federal requirements. 264  Third, I address
facility siting, revisiting Baltimore County's attempt to prevent a
liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal from being sited in an industrial
area on the Chesapeake Bay.265
A. Little Green Yellow Cabs
On Earth Day 2007 Mayor Michael Bloomberg announced PlaNYC, a
broad-reaching plan for sustainable development that aims to cope with
rapid population growth, aging infrastructure, and climate change
mitigation and adaptation. 266 The plan's cross-cutting goal is to reduce
the City's GHG emissions by 30% by 2030.267 Shortly thereafter, the
New York City Council passed the Climate Change Protection Act,
which sets a different GHG reduction target, but adopts PlaNYC
programs as the mechanism for achieving it.
268
As part of PlaNYC, the New York City Taxi and Limousine
Commission (TLC) directed that new taxicabs had to achieve a
minimum city fuel efficiency rating of 25 mpg by October 1, 2008, and
30 mpg by October 1, 2009 (Hybrid Taxi Rules). 269 Because all taxis
must be retired within five years, the rule would have hybridized the taxi
263. Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York (Metro. Taxi 1), No. 08 Civ. 7837, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94021 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2008); Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York,
(Metro. Taxi 11), 633 F. Supp. 2d 83 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also Ophir v. City of Boston, 647 F. Supp. 2d
86 (D. Mass. 2009).
264. Air Conditioning, Heating & Refrigeration Inst. v. City of Albuquerque, No. 08-633
MV/RLP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106706 (D.N.M. Oct. 3, 2008).
265. AES Sparrows Point LNG, LLC v. Smith, 527 F.3d 120, 126 (4th Cir. 2008).
266. CITY OF N.Y., PLANYC: A GREENER, GREATER NEW YORK (2007), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/downloads/pdf/full-report.pdf.
267. Id. at 9.
268. CITY OF NEW YORK, LOCAL LAW No. 55 (2007).
269. Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York (Metro. Taxi 1), No. 08 Civ. 7837, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94021, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2008).
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fleet by 2012.270
A coalition of cab owners, a cab driver, and a passenger challenged
the Hybrid Taxi Rules. 271  A district court judge enjoined the City,
holding that the rules were preempted by Corporate Average Fuel
Efficiency (CAFE) standards promulgated by the National
Transportation and Highway Safety Commission pursuant to the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA).272 The court rejected the City's
argument that as a component of the public transportation system the
cabs were either "obtained for the City's own use" and therefore exempt
under EPCA,273 or qualified for exemption under the MPE.274
Because the City licensed but did not own the cabs, 275 undertook
public notice-and-comment and held public hearings, and the City
Charter explicitly grants the TLC regulatory authority, the court found
that the City must have been acting as a regulator. The judge called the
City's argument that its licensing power makes it a market participant
"fanciful. 276
Subsequently, the TLC repealed the Taxi Hybrid Rules and enacted a
new regulation that increased the maximum lease rate taxi owners using
hybrid vehicles could charge their drivers and decreased the maximum
lease rate for those continuing to use nonhybrid vehicles (Lease Rate
Rule).277 At the same time, the TLC rescinded a rule that prohibited it
from reducing the maximum lease rate unless it found "substantial
evidence of reduced operating expenses of the affected medallion
owners," and granted itself the ability to decrease maximum lease rates
based on "the Commission's assessment of appropriate policy
considerations. 278
A group of taxi fleet owners filed suit, challenging the penalty for
nonhybrid use (though not the incentive). 279 Looking at its purpose and
270. Id. at *7.
271. Id. at *3-4.
272. Id. at *44. The court also found that Clean Air Act did not preempt the rules as they related
to fuel efficiency standards rather than emissions standards. Id. at *39-40; see also Green Mountain
Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007); Cent. Valley Chrysler-
Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
273. See 49 U.S.C. § 32919(c).
274. Metro. Taxi 1, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94021, at *36.
275. Id. at *35.
276. Id. at *33.
277. Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, (Metro. Taxi IH), 633 F. Supp. 2d 83, 88-
89 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The incentive and penalty was calculated based on the difference in cost between a
hybrid vehicle and the standard model Crown Victoria, the only car that met TLC's Taxi Specifications
until 2005, when the City issued separate medallions for hybrids. Id. at 87.
278. Id. at 89-90.
279. Id.
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intent, the court held that the Lease Rate Rule constituted an "effective
mandate" for taxi owners to purchase hybrids achieving certain fuel
efficiencies and therefore was preempted by EPCA.280  The court also
held that the Lease Rate Rule was intended to affect emissions
standards, and was therefore preempted by the Clean Air Act, as well. 281
The result in both cases would differ under this Article's proposed
analysis. 282 First, the City is undertaking an environmental initiative in
an area of traditional local concern.283 Just as regulating waste disposal
and levying taxes are integral parts of local and state government
operations, the taxis are an integral part of the City's public
transportation system. 284  Second, the regulation is part of a
comprehensive "greening" effort that reflects the City's concerns about
population growth, air quality, and climate change, and their impacts on
the City's resources. Third, hybridizing New York City's taxi fleet
would not interfere with the scheme under either EPCA or the Clean Air
Act. In forcing locally licensed taxi owners to purchase readily
available hybrid cars that surpass federal minimum standards the City
imposes no new requirements on manufacturers. A purchase standard
for all City residents, or a purchase standard requiring a fuel efficiency
or emissions standard that is not yet available in mass-produced cars, or
for which no operational infrastructure yet exists (such as electric or
biodiesel cars), might place a new requirement on manufacturers that
disrupts the uniformity sought by federal law; but neither of the City
rules went so far.285 Finally, there is no evidence that hybridizing the
fleet, either by the Taxi Hybrid Rule or the Lease Rate Rule would
externalize any costs. Rather, it reflects an ordering of preferences
280. Id. at 100-03.
281. Id. at 103-05.
282. Cf, Recent Case, Local Government Law-Preemption-Southern District of New York
Holds that New York City Hybrid Taxi Regulations Are Likely Preempted by the EPCA, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 2275 (2009) (arguing that court erred in finding regulation of taxis did not constitute City's "own
use"); see also H.R. 3711, 11 lth Cong. (2009); S. 1741, 11 th Cong. (2009) (Green Taxis Act of 2009)
(proposing that states and localities may enforce fuel economy and emissions standards for taxicabs and
other specified vehicles).
283. In Massachussetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that carbon dioxide and other GHGs are
"air pollutants" under the Clean Air Act, and thus subject to regulation by EPA. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
"[A]ir pollution prevention ... and air pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of
States and local governments." 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (2006); see also Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae, Metro. Taxi Bd. of Trade v. City of N.Y., 09-2901-CV (2d Cir. Jan. 15, 2010)
(describing scope of City's regulation of taxis).
284. The TLC strictly regulates design specifications that limit purchase options; as of 2005, the
only car that satisfied this specifications was the Crown Victoria. See also RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK tit. 35, § 3-03.
285. Nor is there any evidence that a disruption would result if every municipality in the country
hybridized its taxi fleets.
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among local residents, including taxi owners, drivers, and passengers, as
well as other City residents. Thus, New York City would be able to
hybridize its taxi fleet through either of its chosen methods.
B. Green Cities: Building from Inside
As a signatory city to the U.S. Mayor's Climate Protection
Agreement, the City of Albuquerque is committed to "[m]ake energy
efficiency a priority through building code improvements" and to
"[p]ractice and promote sustainable building practices using the U.S.
Green Building Council's LEED program or a similar system.,, 286 As a
member of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, Albuquerque has also
committed to make all new residential and commercial buildings, as
well as all major building renovations, carbon neutral by 2030.287
In 2007, as part of a local initiative called "AlbuquerqueGreen," the
city revised its building code to include performance-based and
prescriptive options for new commercial and residential buildings and
those undergoing substantial addition, alteration, or renovation. The
new code required HVAC, water heating systems, and other building
components that exceed current federal standards for energy
288efficiency. An industry group filed suit, claiming that the code was
preempted by EPCA, 289 as amended by the National Appliance Energy
Conservation Act 290 and the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT
1992).29l
Ruling on a motion to dismiss, the district court found that the code
was most likely preempted as it "effectively require[d]" installing
appliances that exceed federal efficiency standards.292  Such a
requirement, the court held, conflicts with the broad scope of preemption
286. U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 179, § C(5), (7).
287. Architecture 2030, The 2030 Challenge, http://www.architecture2030.org/
2030_challenge/index.html.
288. Air Conditioning, Heating & Refrigeration Inst. v. City of Albuquerque, No. 08-633
MV/RLP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106706, at *5-9 (D.N.M. Oct. 3, 2008).
289. Pub. L. No. 94-163 (1975) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
290. Pub. L. No. 100-12 (1987) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
291. Pub. L. No. 102-486 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 16, 25, 26, 30, 33,
42 & 48 U.S.C.). EPCA, as amended, sets energy conservation standards for commercial heating, air
conditioning, and water heater equipment, and, for certain types of equipment, establishes standards that
correspond to the levels set in the American Society of Heating, Refrigeration, and Air-Conditioning
Engineers (ASHRAE) Standard 90.1. 42 U.S.C. 6313(a) (2006). The law preempts any state or local
regulation "concerning the energy efficiency, energy use, or water use of' covered products. Id.
§ 6297(c). The statute provides a number of exceptions to preemption, including procurement standards
for states and local governments and building code standards for new construction that satisfy specified
criteria. Id. § 6297(e), (f)(3); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 6295(j)-(k), 6313, 6316(a)-(b).
292. Air Conditioning, Heating & Refrigeration Inst, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106706, at *30
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and the specific legislative purpose of protecting appliance
manufacturers from a "patchwork of differing State regulations.,
293
This case's outcome under my proposed test is less certain.
Albuquerque's green building code is a local environmental initiative in
an area of traditional local concern. The code is also part of
AlbuquerqueGreen, a local plan for sustainability and climate change
29mitigation.   In addition, there is no evidence that Albuquerque's
revised building code would externalize costs on another jurisdiction.
As with the New York City taxi rules, it simply orders preferences
among local builders, local landowners, and the commercial and
residential tenants who must shoulder the additional short-term costs
(and gain the long-term benefits) of more efficient appliances. The
code, however, may or may not interfere with EPCA's uniform scheme
for manufacturers. The court entirely ignored whether-regardless of
the federal ceiling-the required appliances are readily available on a
mass market scale. If they are, and the code merely calls for purchasing,
say, Energy Star appliances, then the rule passes under the MPE. If they
are not, then the code imposes new requirements on manufacturers that
would disrupt the expectations of uniformity, and should be preempted.
Both the New York and Albuquerque cases illuminate the trouble
preemption poses to local sustainability and climate change initiatives.
In finding the initiatives preempted, the respective judges paid lip-
service to their purposes and benefits, but did not take them into
account. Rather, the judges focused exclusively on uniformity in the
national market. The expanded MPE test corrects for this lack of vision.
C. L UL Us and Green Energy: Limiting NIMB Yism
In 2006, AES Sparrows Point LNG, LLC (AES) commenced a
prefiling process for an LNG terminal on land it had leased in an
industrial area of the Chesapeake Bay known as Sparrows Point.2 95 In
response to public concern about the project, the Baltimore County
Council passed a bill amending its Zoning Resolutions to stipulate that
an LNG terminal could only be constructed with a "special exception"
and had to conform to set-backs from residential and business zones,
293. Id. at *19-20 (quoting S. REt'. No. 100-6, at 4 (1987)). Another factor that likely influenced
the court's decision was that all of the prescriptive standards were consistent with the most recent
ASHRAE standards, which become the effective federal standards on January 1, 2010. Id. at *8 n.1.
Thus, the court may have taken comfort knowing that the effect of its decision was that the city could
wait a year and then implement the code.
294. A visit to the program's website makes plain that the program is also a branding effort. See
City of Albuquerque, AlbuquerqueGreen, http://www.cabq.gov/albuquerquegreen.
295. AES Sparrows Point LNG, LLC v. Smith, 470 F. Supp. 2d 586, 590 (D. Md. 2007).
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effectively prohibiting the terminal from being built. 296 AES challenged
the ordinance. A district court concluded that EPACT 2005's
amendments to the Natural Gas Act (NGA) vested jurisdiction over
LNG terminal siting exclusively with the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), and that the bill was therefore preempted.
297
The County then passed an amendment to the Zoning Resolutions that
prohibited LNG terminals in the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area (Critical
Area).298 The Critical Area was designated under Section 318(b)(2) of
the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA); the designation affords the
area additional protections from nonpoint pollution sources. 299 AES
filed suit again.
The Country's new bill was a calculated risk. NGA, as amended by
EPACT 2005, includes a savings clause providing that "nothing in the
[NGA] affects the rights of States under" CZMA (or the Clean Air Act
or Clean Water Act). 300  After the suit was filed, the County asked
Maryland's Critical Area Commission for the Chesapeake and Atlantic
Coastal Bays to amend the County's Chesapeake and Atlantic Coastal
Bays Critical Area Protection Program (CAPP) to include the new
restriction on LNG terminal siting in coastal areas, which the
Commission promptly did. The approval was significant because CAPP
is one of mechanisms that constitute the state's Coastal Management
Plan (CMP) under CZMA. The Commission, however, never presented
the local law to the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) for approval, as required under CZMA's
procedures for amending state CMPs.
30 1
The district court found that NGA did not preempt the local law
because the ordinance was incorporated into Maryland's CMP. On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that NGA preempted the
local law because Maryland could not amend its coastal management
plan without approval from NOAA.3 °2
296. Id. at 601.
297. Id. It bears noting that though EPACT 2005 confers "exclusive authority" in FERC, the
statute does not divorce state and local governments from the process. See 15 U.S.C. § 717n(b)(l)
(2006) (requiring notice-and-comment on lead agency determination); id. § 717b-I (requiring FERC to
consult with appointed state agency, and providing state agency opportunity to submit "advisory report"
detailing state and local concerns). See generally Josh Lute, LNG Terminals: Future or Folly?, 43
WILLAMEITE L. REV. 621, 643-45 (2007) (summarizing LNG terminal siting process after EPACT
2005).
298. AES Sparrows Point, 470 F. Supp. at 590.
299. 16 U.S.C. § 1455b(b)(2).
300. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d).
301. AES Sparrows Point LNG, LLC v. Smith, 527 F.3d 120, 123 (4th Cir. 2008).
302. Id. at 126; see also Jacob Dweck et al., Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Litigation After the
Energy Policy Act of 2005: State Powers in LNG Terminal Siting, 27 ENERGY L.J. 473, 487-91 (2006)
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Applying my expanded MPE to either of the County's ordinances
reveals the test's limiting factors. The local laws in AES I and AESII
prohibited siting an LNG terminal at Sparrow's Point. While either
might arguably constitute an "environmental initiative" in and area of
traditional local concern-i.e., land use-neither was part of a
comprehensive sustainability or climate change action plan.
303
Moreover, given the timing of the laws, both have the stink of spot
zoning. Finally, the laws would fail the cost-externalization prong of the
test. The LNG terminal would have to be located in another coastal area
in the Mid-Atlantic region, possibly on just the other side of the
County's jurisdictional line, while the County would likely enjoy the
benefits of an increased LNG supply.
30 4
Thus, while interlocal competition and the race to the top may lead
localities to limit siting LNG terminals or LULUs, my proposed revision
to the MPE protects against NIMBY responses.
I anticipate several criticisms of my proposed test. For instance,
looking at the above instances, one might argue that the MPE is an
unwieldy device. Like other balancing tests, it calls on courts to define
potentially broad categories-such as "comprehensive climate change
plan"-and make potentially difficult assessments-such as what
constitutes "substantial interference" with a federal ceiling or amounts to
"substantial externalization of costs." These tests leave interpretive
work to the judges, and may allow them to "smuggle in" their own
substantive policy preferences. 305  But it is difficult, at this point, to
uncover a judicial test that does not allow judges to do so. Beyond that,
such tests have been, and continue to be applied-and not without
positive effects.
30 6
Alternatively, one might argue that the test gives away too much, and
(analyzing other LNG terminal suits involving conflicts with state and local law under CZMA).
303. Liquefied natural gas is an efficient transporter of natural gas supplies from around the
world, and natural gas is a cleaner and more efficient source of energy than coal, with fewer CO 2 and
other GHG emissions. Cite. Thus, it would be difficult to argue how banning such a facility supports
sustainability or climate change mitigation.
304. See also Weaver's Cove Energy, LLC v. R.I. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, 583 F. Supp. 2d
259 (D.R.I. 2008), aff'd, 589 F.3d 458 (1 st Cir. 2009) (state's requirement that LNG facility obtain state
approval under Public Trust Doctrine for use of submerged lands preempted by NGA).
305. 1 am grateful to Rich Schragger who raised this issue by pointing out that my proposed test
mimics many state-level tests that assess whether a local action falls within a local government's home
rule powers.
306. For example, as Richard Briffault points out, localities sometimes win in state court when the
court is asked to balance the local interests in local political innovations against their potential external
effects: "The key to local success in the balancing cases appears to be the combination of the intense
local interest in the structures and procedures of local governance, with the absence of external effects or
state-wide costs from local variations." Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22
J. L. & POL. 1, 28 (2006).
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that the impact of local law on a uniform market or standard should be
part of the preemption analysis itself, as it is part of the dormant
Commerce Clause. Tom Merrill has suggested this elsewhere,
describing anti-Balkanization and anti-NIMBY default rules for
preemption. 30 7  Similarly, Alex Klass has argued that the preemption
test could be modified to account for innovative state actions.30 8 It is
also possible for preemption analyses to directly apply the Pike
balancing test-or something like it.30 9  I do not disagree with these
suggestions. I am concerned, though, that courts have signaled that such
a balancing is unlikely to occur against ceiling preemption of local
climate action. A more likely avenue of legal argument may be along
the lines of the "state self-promotion" or "government entity" exception
announced in United Haulers and carried forward in Davis. But that
analysis is for another day.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article considers whether the market participant exception
should be interpreted to exempt local climate change and sustainability
initiatives from the limits imposed by existing and future federal
environmental ceilings. Local governments have been at the vanguard
of climate change and sustainability planning, but have found their
ability to respond to resident preferences and the pressures of place
competition hemmed in by a preemption doctrine that fails to account
for both the motives behind the action and the actual effect such action
has on the federal scheme. The doctrinal evolution, theoretical
foundations, and proposed rule expansion discussed in this Article
provide advocates the sources and contours of an argument with which
to defend future initiatives against preemption challenges; they also
provoke scholars to look more seriously at the intersection of the MPE
and the realities of the race to the top in the market for residents,
businesses, and capital. The test proposed here better reflects the values
underlying the exception, without interfering with the purposes behind
federalization of some environmental law. The result would be greater
local autonomy, more local innovation, and greater reductions in GHG
emissions nationwide.
307. Merrill, supra note 93.
308. Klass, State Innovation, supra note 252, at 1704-16.
309. See N.Y. Susquehanna & W. Ry. Corp. v. Jackson, 500 F.3d 238, 254 (3d Cir. 2007) (a state
law that affects rail carriage survives preemption under Interstate Commerce Commission Termination
Act if it does not discriminate against or unreasonably burden rail carriage); see also Wells &
Hellerstein, supra note 21, at 1126 (arguing that government-proprietary distinction can be jettisoned
altogether in favor of Pike balancing test).
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